<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" xmlns:googleplay="http://www.google.com/schemas/play-podcasts/1.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[The Trade War Lab]]></title><description><![CDATA[Analyzing trade politics through research, analysis, engagement, and innovation. Supported by the University of Kansas. ]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com</link><generator>Substack</generator><lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 00:20:04 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.tradewarlab.com/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><copyright><![CDATA[The Trade War Lab]]></copyright><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><webMaster><![CDATA[thetradewarlab@substack.com]]></webMaster><itunes:owner><itunes:email><![CDATA[thetradewarlab@substack.com]]></itunes:email><itunes:name><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></itunes:name></itunes:owner><itunes:author><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></itunes:author><googleplay:owner><![CDATA[thetradewarlab@substack.com]]></googleplay:owner><googleplay:email><![CDATA[thetradewarlab@substack.com]]></googleplay:email><googleplay:author><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></googleplay:author><itunes:block><![CDATA[Yes]]></itunes:block><item><title><![CDATA[Why the Same U.S. Tariff Benefit Some States and Hurt Others]]></title><description><![CDATA[Analysis by Kristy Nguyen.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/why-the-same-us-tariff-benefit-some</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/why-the-same-us-tariff-benefit-some</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 15:05:05 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Uvju!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F687926de-fe64-43ed-8812-aff47614f448_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Uvju!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F687926de-fe64-43ed-8812-aff47614f448_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Uvju!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F687926de-fe64-43ed-8812-aff47614f448_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Uvju!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F687926de-fe64-43ed-8812-aff47614f448_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Uvju!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F687926de-fe64-43ed-8812-aff47614f448_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Uvju!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F687926de-fe64-43ed-8812-aff47614f448_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Uvju!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F687926de-fe64-43ed-8812-aff47614f448_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/687926de-fe64-43ed-8812-aff47614f448_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:2861071,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/224711144?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F687926de-fe64-43ed-8812-aff47614f448_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Uvju!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F687926de-fe64-43ed-8812-aff47614f448_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Uvju!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F687926de-fe64-43ed-8812-aff47614f448_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Uvju!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F687926de-fe64-43ed-8812-aff47614f448_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Uvju!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F687926de-fe64-43ed-8812-aff47614f448_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>The United States is a collection of 50 different economies that differ in both what they produce and who they trade with. Much like the European Union, the states within the U.S. are free to trade amongst themselves, though unlike the EU the U.S. can set national tariffs on foreign goods that apply to all states. Differences in industrial specialization, productivity, workforce composition, and access to foreign markets mean that one policy can have sharply different local effects. To attempt to rectify that asymmetrical, The United States&#8217; federal government can redistribute the revenue collected from tariffs across states. This system means balancing tariff revenue with states&#8217; compensation is central to U.S. trade policy.</p><p><a href="https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/working-papers/2023/2023-09">A recent paper by</a> Ana Maria Santacreu of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Michael Sposi of Southern Methodist University, and Jing Zhang of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago investigates these differences. In &#8220;What Determines State Heterogeneity in Response to U.S. Tariff Changes?&#8221; (2026), the authors examine how changes in trade policy affect production, labor income, and consumption across states. Their analysis separates changes in workers&#8217; real incomes from the tariff revenue distributed through the federal government. This distinction helps show whether differences in outcomes stem from states&#8217; industrial strengths or from how tariff revenue is shared. The authors ask why states respond so differently to the same tariff and whether redistributing tariff revenue can offset the losses.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p>To explain these differences, the authors distinguish between external and internal comparative advantage. External comparative advantage describes industries in which the United States is relatively better, or more cost-effective, at making a good than foreign economies, such as computers and electronics or chemicals; the country is comparatively weaker in industries such as mining and textiles. An internal comparative advantage describes industries in which a state is relatively better, or more cost-effective, at making a good then other U.S. states; Wyoming specializes in mining, while Oregon is relatively strong in computers and electronics. When tariffs make imported goods more expensive, spending shifts toward domestic producers, especially in industries where the United States normally depends more on foreign suppliers. States specializing in those protected industries benefit most. The central finding is that states tend to gain more when their internal strengths lie in industries where the United States is comparatively weak abroad.</p><p>To test this explanation, the authors build a model of trade using projected trends based off 2012 [unit of analysis]-level data among 50 states, eight foreign economies, and the rest of the world, covering 16 different industries. The model incorporates differences in productivity, trade costs, labor skills, and the inputs industries purchase from one another. It also estimates trade flows where direct state-level information is unavailable. In the main experiment, the authors increase U.S. import tariffs on goods by 25 percentage points, assume foreign countries do not retaliate, and initially prevent workers from moving between industries or states. Tariff revenue is returned to workers in equal amounts after adjusting for local prices. This setup allows the authors to separate consumption changes arising from workers&#8217; real incomes from those arising from revenue transfers.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0CV6!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe080bfe5-e5ce-4653-9a01-ecd067516a58_945x583.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0CV6!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe080bfe5-e5ce-4653-9a01-ecd067516a58_945x583.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0CV6!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe080bfe5-e5ce-4653-9a01-ecd067516a58_945x583.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0CV6!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe080bfe5-e5ce-4653-9a01-ecd067516a58_945x583.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0CV6!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe080bfe5-e5ce-4653-9a01-ecd067516a58_945x583.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0CV6!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe080bfe5-e5ce-4653-9a01-ecd067516a58_945x583.png" width="945" height="583" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/e080bfe5-e5ce-4653-9a01-ecd067516a58_945x583.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:583,&quot;width&quot;:945,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0CV6!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe080bfe5-e5ce-4653-9a01-ecd067516a58_945x583.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0CV6!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe080bfe5-e5ce-4653-9a01-ecd067516a58_945x583.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0CV6!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe080bfe5-e5ce-4653-9a01-ecd067516a58_945x583.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0CV6!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe080bfe5-e5ce-4653-9a01-ecd067516a58_945x583.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><em>Figure: Map of the percentage change in consumption across U.S. states following a 25-percentage-point tariff increase. Source: Santacreu, Sposi, and Zhang (2026), Figure 7.</em></p><p>Under these assumptions, U.S. consumption rises by 0.54% on average, but state outcomes range from a 0.8% decline in Washington to a 2.3% increase in Montana. Industry matters substantially more than geography, differences between industries account for 79% of the variation in changes in real income across state-industry pairs, compared with 3% for differences between states. Wyoming and Oregon show why. Wyoming&#8217;s consumption rises by 1.91%, while Oregon&#8217;s rises by only 0.30%. Changes in real income contribute 0.68 percentage points to Wyoming&#8217;s result but subtract 1.25 points from Oregon&#8217;s. Their tariff-revenue contributions are relatively similar. Wyoming benefits from protection for mining, an industry in which it is competitive domestically, but the United States is comparatively weak internationally.</p><p>These gains become smaller when the authors relax the assumption that workers remain in place. If workers can change industries within their state, the national consumption gain falls to 0.23%; if they can also move between states, it turns into a 0.11% loss. Workers respond to tariff-induced wage changes by shifting toward protected industries and locations, which are not necessarily the most productive. Foreign retaliation is even more damaging. When trading partners impose matching 25-percentage-point tariffs on U.S. goods, the initial 0.54% national gain becomes a 0.94% loss under immobile labor. The spread of outcomes across states also doubles, as states more reliant on foreign export markets face larger losses. National gains, then, depend on both workers&#8217; ability to move and other countries&#8217; responses.</p><p>These uneven effects also give states different preferences over tariff policy. With immobile labor, the model estimates that a 26-percentage-point increase maximizes national consumption, compared with 19 points for Oregon and 34 for Ohio; Wyoming&#8217;s preferred increase has no upper bound in the model. Because the United States is a fiscal union, it could redistribute additional tariff revenue to compensate states that lose, but only when a tariff produces enough aggregate gains to share. The authors&#8217; simulation of the 2018&#8211;2019 trade war illustrates the stakes. Without retaliation, 13 states experience consumption losses; with retaliation, 36 do, and national consumption falls by 0.3%. The inference here is that the possibility of compensating those losers depends on whether the country gains at all.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Is there anybody out there? The search for friendly trade partners ]]></title><description><![CDATA[Analysis by Isabela Paradis.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/is-there-anybody-out-there-the-search</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/is-there-anybody-out-there-the-search</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 15:02:54 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!v2nS!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4a86b65a-ee2c-4ec5-b2e3-c7edf6203516_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!v2nS!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4a86b65a-ee2c-4ec5-b2e3-c7edf6203516_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!v2nS!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4a86b65a-ee2c-4ec5-b2e3-c7edf6203516_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!v2nS!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4a86b65a-ee2c-4ec5-b2e3-c7edf6203516_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!v2nS!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4a86b65a-ee2c-4ec5-b2e3-c7edf6203516_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!v2nS!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4a86b65a-ee2c-4ec5-b2e3-c7edf6203516_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!v2nS!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4a86b65a-ee2c-4ec5-b2e3-c7edf6203516_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/4a86b65a-ee2c-4ec5-b2e3-c7edf6203516_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1516149,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/223625928?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4a86b65a-ee2c-4ec5-b2e3-c7edf6203516_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!v2nS!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4a86b65a-ee2c-4ec5-b2e3-c7edf6203516_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!v2nS!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4a86b65a-ee2c-4ec5-b2e3-c7edf6203516_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!v2nS!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4a86b65a-ee2c-4ec5-b2e3-c7edf6203516_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!v2nS!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4a86b65a-ee2c-4ec5-b2e3-c7edf6203516_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>The trade relationship between the United States and China has grown to become one of the largest in modern history. By 2016, bilateral trade had reached $578 billion; however, the U.S. imported substantially more goods from China than it exported. During the 2016 presidential election, Donald Trump campaigned on a promise to challenge China&#8217;s trade practices and reduce the trade deficit. Between 2018 and 2019, his administration imposed tariffs ranging from 7.5% to 25% on nearly two thirds of all U.S. imports from China. The tariffs put pressure on U.S. firms to sever ties with Chinese suppliers or pay the tariffs themselves. Leaving China, however, was not a simple task. For many products, there was nowhere else to go. So, which firms are able to walk away?</p><p>In &#8220;<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-025-09596-1">Allied import options available? Finding friendly trade partners amidst decoupling from China</a>,&#8221; Ayse Eldes (Princeton University), Jieun Lee (University at Buffalo), and Iain Osgood (University of Michigan) investigate what allows U.S. firms to cut ties with Chinese suppliers as pressure to decouple increases. Decoupling occurs when two countries that were previously economically interdependent begin to weaken or sever their economic ties. The authors argue that a firm&#8217;s ability to leave China depends on whether it can buy the same products from allied or friendly countries.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p>According to the authors, there are three main challenges to decoupling. First, the cost of switching suppliers can involve a lengthy search for new markets, ending contracts, and disrupting production, all of which can be too great for some countries. These costs can be even higher for U.S. firms that own manufacturing facilities in China, which account for roughly a quarter of U.S. imports from China. Second, a feasible alternative host market or supplier could be nonexistent. Manufacturing tends to settle in a few places, and China&#8217;s &#8220;external economies of scale&#8221; give it advantages that are difficult to replicate. The third challenge and core contribution of the paper is finding an alternative supplier that does not recreate the same political risk that came with an integrated U.S.-China economy. Since the push to decouple is political, moving production from China to another U.S. rival may simply trade one set of risks for another. Allies, by contrast, are less likely to go to war with the U.S., so trade with them &#8220;should remain free if hot conflict emerges.&#8221;</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9hnU!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c3941ea-a4cc-4c8e-867f-b7d8c529ced4_354x538.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9hnU!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c3941ea-a4cc-4c8e-867f-b7d8c529ced4_354x538.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9hnU!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c3941ea-a4cc-4c8e-867f-b7d8c529ced4_354x538.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9hnU!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c3941ea-a4cc-4c8e-867f-b7d8c529ced4_354x538.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9hnU!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c3941ea-a4cc-4c8e-867f-b7d8c529ced4_354x538.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9hnU!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c3941ea-a4cc-4c8e-867f-b7d8c529ced4_354x538.png" width="354" height="538" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/5c3941ea-a4cc-4c8e-867f-b7d8c529ced4_354x538.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:538,&quot;width&quot;:354,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9hnU!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c3941ea-a4cc-4c8e-867f-b7d8c529ced4_354x538.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9hnU!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c3941ea-a4cc-4c8e-867f-b7d8c529ced4_354x538.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9hnU!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c3941ea-a4cc-4c8e-867f-b7d8c529ced4_354x538.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9hnU!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c3941ea-a4cc-4c8e-867f-b7d8c529ced4_354x538.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><em>Figure 1. The availability of alternative suppliers varied across products, with fewer allied and friendly alternatives than total non-China alternatives. Source: Eldes, Lee, and Osgood (2026), Figure 2.</em></p><p>To test their argument, the authors used product-level data on U.S. imports. For each product they counted how many other countries were already selling each product to the U.S. between 2012 and 2016, before the trade war began. They then compared how imports from China changed after the tariffs for products with many existing alternative suppliers versus products with few or none, looking at two periods, 2018 to 2020 and 2021 to 2023. To test whether political relationships mattered, they sorted these alternative suppliers into allied countries, those with a defense, offense, or neutrality pact with the U.S. active in 2018, and friendly countries, those that generally vote the same way as the U.S. in the UN General Assembly. Finally, they used data on tariff exclusion requests to see whether firms without alternatives were more likely to push back against the tariffs.</p><p>The authors found that having other options made a sizeable difference. Between 2018 and 2020, imports from China fell roughly 29-34% more for products already supplied by all 10 top trading partners, than for products supplied by none. From 2021 to 2023, this gap grew to 40% or more. However, not every alternative was equally useful. Doubling the number of allied suppliers was associated with an 11-14% larger decline in imports from China, growing to 15-20% in the later period, and friendly suppliers had a similar effect. Non-allied and unfriendly alternatives had no statistically significant effect. This suggests that U.S. firms were more capable of reducing their reliance on China when they already had politically safe countries supplying the same products.</p><p>Eldes, Lee, and Osgood show that tariffs on their own cannot force U.S. firms to decouple from China. Notably, their contribution points out that firms need both a reason to leave, and somewhere safe to go. Where allied or friendly suppliers already existed, imports from China fell sharply and kept falling. Where they did not, firms stayed tied to Chinese suppliers and turned to the USTR for relief. The findings suggest that decoupling from China will be slow and uneven, and concentrated in products with safe substitutes. For policymakers, the paper points to a broader lesson of building trade tied with allied and friends to help reduce the dependence on China.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Afterlife of Hegemony ]]></title><description><![CDATA[Analysis by Claire Ain.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/the-afterlife-of-hegemony</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/the-afterlife-of-hegemony</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 14:01:06 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!T_Cp!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94f23714-67e7-4de0-a2a7-be22a226505f_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!T_Cp!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94f23714-67e7-4de0-a2a7-be22a226505f_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!T_Cp!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94f23714-67e7-4de0-a2a7-be22a226505f_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!T_Cp!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94f23714-67e7-4de0-a2a7-be22a226505f_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!T_Cp!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94f23714-67e7-4de0-a2a7-be22a226505f_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!T_Cp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94f23714-67e7-4de0-a2a7-be22a226505f_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!T_Cp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94f23714-67e7-4de0-a2a7-be22a226505f_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/94f23714-67e7-4de0-a2a7-be22a226505f_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:2814193,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/222639402?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94f23714-67e7-4de0-a2a7-be22a226505f_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!T_Cp!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94f23714-67e7-4de0-a2a7-be22a226505f_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!T_Cp!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94f23714-67e7-4de0-a2a7-be22a226505f_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!T_Cp!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94f23714-67e7-4de0-a2a7-be22a226505f_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!T_Cp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94f23714-67e7-4de0-a2a7-be22a226505f_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Hegemons rise and fall, yet international cooperation often outlasts them. Even today, in an era of declining US relative power, rising economic nationalism, and tension-filled alliances, many are asking why cooperation can sustain itself. This seemingly contradictory puzzle makes Robert Keohane&#8217;s <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691122489/after-hegemony">After Hegemony</a> worth revisiting. Published in 1984, the book responded directly to hegemonic stability theory and realist skepticism toward cooperation. Its central question remains essential today. Can international cooperation exist among self-interested states, even without a hegemon to enforce it? </p><p>Keohane opens by confronting a key dilemma in international political economy. He asks why would cooperation occur at all in an anarchic world without overarching authority? Hegemonic stability theory argues that a stable liberal economic order requires a dominant power to provide public goods and enforce international rules. Rather than accept hegemonic stability theory&#8217;s answer, Keohane applies post-1945 economic coordination to challenge the assumption that only power can produce cooperation. By arguing that hegemony is neither necessary nor sufficient for sustained cooperation, he highlights that international regime&#8217;s structure incentives, reduce uncertainty, and provide material advantages that make cooperation beneficial for self-interested states.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p>Regimes are what let cooperation survive after a hegemon declines. Keohane defines them as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that states expect each other to follow, less like formal governments and more like shared habits of behavior. They don&#8217;t erase self-interest, and no outside authority enforces them. Instead, they work by making information easier to get, making transactions cheaper, and cheating easier to spot, enough to make coordination pay and defection costly. History bears this out. British dominance in the nineteenth century produced &#8220;far less systematic rule-making power&#8221; than hegemonic stability theory predicts (33), and when U.S. power eroded in the 1960s, cooperation didn&#8217;t collapse with it. In both cases, the expectations states had built up outlasting the power that created them.</p><p>This is the foundation of neoliberal institutionalism which is the theory that states are still rational and self-interested, exactly what realists assume, but that alone doesn&#8217;t doom them to constant conflict. Keohane draws one more distinction here, between cooperation and harmony. Harmony is when interests already align on their own, with no adjustment needed. Cooperation is what states do when interests conflict but adjusting still pays off, in Keohane&#8217;s words, bringing &#8220;the action of separate individuals or organizations&#8212;which are not in preexistent harmony&#8212;be brought into conformity with one another&#8221; (51). What makes that rational rather than naive is repetition: states expect to deal with each other again, so cooperation today can be rewarded and defection punished later. Keohane doesn&#8217;t oversell this. Regimes still face real limits, including moral hazard, collective action problems, and genuine uncertainty about whether an institution will hold (88).</p><p>Keohane&#8217;s empirical examples demonstrate that these regimes (e.g., GATT, the IMF) shape behavior. American protectionism shows that regimes function as cognitive devices to guide decision-making and stabilize expectations. For example, voluntary export restraints often replaced quotas even though quotas would have captured more rent for governments, suggesting that established expectations within GATT shaped economic choices beyond just material incentives (99). Created through US leadership, the International Energy Agency provides another example of reciprocal expectations, demonstrating how governments can reduce transaction costs without directly enforcing state behavior. It sustained its function through the qualities found within international regimes rather than through continued US enforcement. Even its &#8220;fiasco&#8221; in 1979 demonstrates the limits and adaptability of regimes rather than their complete collapse when conflict approaches (240).</p><p>Even in what has appeared to become a more realist world today, Keohane&#8217;s argument remains relevant. Tariffs, export controls, and sanctions show that states are increasingly willing to pursue unilateral, zero-sum strategies, yet institutions like the WTO and NATO haven&#8217;t collapsed the way realists might expect. Keohane&#8217;s framework predicts exactly this. Regimes don&#8217;t need every member&#8217;s full faith to survive. They need defection to stay costlier than coordination, even when trust is thin. The harder question is what happens if that calculation flips, if major powers conclude that institutions no longer produce mutual gains at all. The U.S.-China trade war looks like an early test case. Washington and Beijing have both bypassed WTO dispute mechanisms in favor of unilateral tariffs, betting that the cost of going around the regime is lower than the cost of working through it. Keohane never assumed cooperation was guaranteed to survive. He explained the conditions that make it possible, and today those conditions are being tested in real time. </p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Why the Weak Concede and the Strong Don't]]></title><description><![CDATA[Analysis by Harris Chaudhry. Part of the Classic Series.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/why-the-weak-concede-and-the-strong</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/why-the-weak-concede-and-the-strong</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:09:14 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GZpI!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F721ffdf0-46a4-42ff-8896-d7cdbae61dd0_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GZpI!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F721ffdf0-46a4-42ff-8896-d7cdbae61dd0_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GZpI!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F721ffdf0-46a4-42ff-8896-d7cdbae61dd0_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GZpI!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F721ffdf0-46a4-42ff-8896-d7cdbae61dd0_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GZpI!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F721ffdf0-46a4-42ff-8896-d7cdbae61dd0_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GZpI!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F721ffdf0-46a4-42ff-8896-d7cdbae61dd0_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GZpI!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F721ffdf0-46a4-42ff-8896-d7cdbae61dd0_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/721ffdf0-46a4-42ff-8896-d7cdbae61dd0_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:3101718,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/221685438?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F721ffdf0-46a4-42ff-8896-d7cdbae61dd0_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GZpI!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F721ffdf0-46a4-42ff-8896-d7cdbae61dd0_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GZpI!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F721ffdf0-46a4-42ff-8896-d7cdbae61dd0_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GZpI!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F721ffdf0-46a4-42ff-8896-d7cdbae61dd0_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GZpI!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F721ffdf0-46a4-42ff-8896-d7cdbae61dd0_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Sanctions are one of the most common tools states use to pressure one another without resorting to military force, yet they often fail to produce meaningful concessions. That tension is the central puzzle Daniel Drezner takes up in <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/sanctions-paradox/4542E89CDBABCBE49039C580F9A7F5F3">The Sanctions Paradox</a>. If sanctions so often seem ineffective, why do states keep using them? Drezner builds on <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691204420/economic-statecraft?srsltid=AfmBOoo32zW-D1xIJGwBkWawufJDniXVGlhGHaFKhbu6vgdxfaZA5dfZ">David Baldwin&#8217;s Economic Statecraft</a>, which challenged the field&#8217;s tendency to dismiss economic coercion by arguing that scholars were measuring &#8220;success&#8221; too narrowly. This piece examines that theory, the statistical evidence behind it, and Drezner&#8217;s case study of Russian coercion in the former Soviet space.</p><p>Drezner&#8217;s main argument starts with a simple observation. How much a sanction hurts is not what determines whether the sanction works effectively. What matters more is what the target of the sanction expects to happen next. Picture two countries that expect to keep clashing for years to come. If the target gives in now, it&#8217;s not just a one-time loss. It hands the other side leverage it can use again later, and it looks weak in the process. So, the target holds out, even when the sanctions are genuinely painful. Drezner calls this the conflict expectations model, and it produces a real paradox. Countries sanction their enemies far more often than their friends yet get fewer results from it. </p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p>Sanctioning a friend is rarer, but far more likely to work. Cost still plays a role, just not the only one. The more a sanction hurts the target, the more pressure it feels to concede. The more it costs the country imposing the sanction to keep it up, the more pressure that country feels to back down. Drezner calls this tug-of-war the costs of deadlock. But when two countries expect to be rivals for a long time, that calculation gets overridden entirely. This is why Drezner argues that power isn&#8217;t just about GDP or military size. It depends on the relationship between the two countries, and can even shift from one issue to the next.</p><p>Drezner backs this up with the statistical record before turning to a single case in depth. Looking across a large number of sanctions episodes, he finds that countries usually only imposed sanctions when the target stood to suffer as much as they did. Allies gave in more readily. Adversaries dug in and offered fewer concessions. Overall, economic cost and the expectation of future conflict predicted outcomes more reliably than raw military or economic power. To test this pattern in depth, Drezner turns to Russia&#8217;s coercion of the former Soviet republics from 1992 through 1997, a useful case precisely because Russia was more dominant than any of these states, yet the outcomes still varied significantly, suggesting that raw power alone could not explain the results. Belarus was highly dependent on Russian trade, energy, credit, and security support and generally viewed Russia as an ally, so it made major concessions on nuclear weapons, military bases, and strategic industries. Kazakhstan similarly conceded on nuclear weapons but resisted dual citizenship and autonomy for ethnic Russians, since those concessions could create future Russian leverage over its territorial integrity. This shows that conflict expectations could vary even within a single country, shifting from one issue to the next.</p><p>Ukraine, on the other hand, presents the opposite pattern. While the country was highly dependent on Russian energy and trade, it viewed Russia as a future security threat. Russia pressured Ukraine over nuclear weapons, Soviet assets, the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol, and other strategic industries. Ukraine made moderate concessions but resisted exclusive Russian control and demanded compensation, debt relief, and recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty. It also had some counter leverage because Russian gas exports to Europe traveled through Ukrainian pipelines. Economic costs pushed Ukraine toward compromise, but conflict expectations limited how much it was willing to surrender.</p><p>Drezner&#8217;s comparison of the 39 Russian coercion cases gives some of his strongest evidence. Allied countries made major concessions in 73.3 percent of cases, compared with only 16.7 percent for adversaries. When moderate concessions are included, every allied case produced at least some meaningful success, while only 37.5 percent of adversarial cases did. His statistical analysis also finds that the absence of expected future conflict was the strongest predictor of concession size. The Boolean analysis reaches a similar conclusion: major concessions were most likely when the target was a Russian ally and Russia relied on economic pressure without adding military threats. This directly supports Drezner&#8217;s argument that expectations of future conflict help explain why similar economic pressure can lead to very different outcomes.&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;</p><p>Drezner&#8217;s analytical perspective remains fruitful for policymakers and academics alike, because it explains why economic pressure works in some relationships and fails completely in others. His model gives a clear answer. Sanctions struggle when states expect a long fight ahead, because giving in now means handing a rival leverage it can use for years. When the future still looks cooperative, though, compromises become much easier. This is playing out in real time. Western sanctions have imposed real costs<sup>1</sup> on Russia&#8217;s economy since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, yet Moscow has made no meaningful concessions, exactly what Drezner&#8217;s model predicts for two states that expect their conflict to continue rather than resolve. That is what makes his book useful today. It was never really a history of the 1990s. It is a framework for reading today&#8217;s sanctions before they play out.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[THE TRADE WARS’ BYSTANDERS: How does US-China Tariffs affect Third-party countries?]]></title><description><![CDATA[Analysis by Cooper Hefty.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/the-trade-wars-bystanders-how-does</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/the-trade-wars-bystanders-how-does</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 14:13:11 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!20hK!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdf1b11ea-0e50-46af-b8f0-08588c729b5e_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!20hK!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdf1b11ea-0e50-46af-b8f0-08588c729b5e_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!20hK!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdf1b11ea-0e50-46af-b8f0-08588c729b5e_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!20hK!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdf1b11ea-0e50-46af-b8f0-08588c729b5e_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!20hK!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdf1b11ea-0e50-46af-b8f0-08588c729b5e_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!20hK!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdf1b11ea-0e50-46af-b8f0-08588c729b5e_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!20hK!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdf1b11ea-0e50-46af-b8f0-08588c729b5e_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/df1b11ea-0e50-46af-b8f0-08588c729b5e_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1538856,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/220637190?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdf1b11ea-0e50-46af-b8f0-08588c729b5e_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!20hK!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdf1b11ea-0e50-46af-b8f0-08588c729b5e_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!20hK!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdf1b11ea-0e50-46af-b8f0-08588c729b5e_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!20hK!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdf1b11ea-0e50-46af-b8f0-08588c729b5e_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!20hK!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdf1b11ea-0e50-46af-b8f0-08588c729b5e_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>The trade war between the U.S. and China has had lasting effects on both nations domestic and international markets, prices, and companies. While much scholarly attention has been paid to the effects of these tariffs on both nations, international trade is no longer a two-player game. Nations maintain complex webs of trade with hundreds of different nations over thousands of different goods. Thus, a U.S. tariff on China does not solely affect China, but every third country that fits within China and the U.S.&#8217;s relevant supply chains &#8211; whether that&#8217;s Vietnam, Germany, India, Brazil, etc. These indirect effects of the U.S.-China trade war have a bounce-back effect since 2/3rds of international trade is conducted by multinational corporations (MNCs) that often have operations within both the U.S. and China. With the complexities of the indirect effects of the trade war, scholarly work was bound to fill that informational gap. </p><p>A group of researchers &#8211; Harald Fadinger (University of Vienna), Lei Li (University of G&#246;ttingen), Sophia Praetorius (University of Geneva), and Jan Schymik (University of Mannheim) &#8211; seeks to figure out how the U.S.-China trade war benefited/harmed third countries and reshaped global economic activity and in turn the geography of supply chains. As a measurement of third countries&#8217; economic effects, the researchers track the change in sales, employment and exports for firms throughout the trade war (2018-2022), specifically focusing on the differing effects of input tariffs (taxes foreign intermediate goods, like raw materials) and output tariffs (taxes on domestic exporters). Since much of international trade &#8211; about 2/3rds &#8211; is operated by Multinational Corporations (MNCs) having affiliates in third countries, the researches accounted for companies&#8217; affiliate status and compared MNC affiliates to domestic firms results. They ultimately found that Multinational Corporations&#8217; (MNCs) affiliate firms were more impacted by tariffs than domestic firms. They also found that while on-net the effects of tariffs were nearly balanced, the specificities of sender/receiver and output/input provided nuance as to when third countries were benefited/hurt. </p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p>To collect their data, the researches took plant-level data using Dun &amp; Bradstreet&#8217;s WorldBase database of the top 50 largest countries of 200 based on 2018 GPD (excluding U.S. and China for third country data) to track a firms sales, employment, and connections to an MNC headquarters over the course of the Trade War (2018-2022). With hand-collected data on U.S. and Chinese tariffs, the researchers calculate the impact of tariffs weighted by the necessary inputs for an industries production. Using the data set and formula, the researchers track a few key variables. First, they use the Worldbase&#8217;s database to test how the change in tariffs from 2018-2022 affected third countries&#8217; firms sales, employment, and number of firms compared to MNC affiliates. Second, they use product-level trade data from the UN Comtrade to track third country exports over the same span of time, isolating exports specifically to U.S. and China. Finally, they used the WorldBase dataset to track firms affiliate status with an MNC along with their sales, employment, and headquarters location (North America, Europe, Asia, etc.). With these measures in hand, the authors ask which tariffs helped third countries, and which ones hurt them. </p><p>While there are nuances that enable us to parse when and where tariffs hurt and help, across the data it was fairly consistent that from 2018-2022 multinational corporations responded more significally to tariffs than domestic firms. Their sales were the only significant figures, increasing for U.S. output tariffs on China and Chinese input tariffs on the U.S., and decreasing for Chinese output tariffs on the U.S. and U.S. input tariffs on China. While there are differences in what tariffs increased/decreased sales, the overall effect of tariffs on the 50 largest countries (in terms of 2018 GDP) over the trade war was slightly negative, though was statistically essentially zero. Despite this, the data still displays interesting fluctuations worth theoretical consideration as the trend of protectionism has, as we now know, become a growing economic strategy. To understand the differing effects of tariffs on third countries, the researchers explain that some third countries create more substitution goods &#8211; a good that can be supplemented &#8211; while others create more complementary goods &#8211; goods that must be bought alongside another one and thus have linked demands/prices. </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rmWn!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d70333f-ef2b-4d3c-a259-8da15e3061e5_621x384.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rmWn!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d70333f-ef2b-4d3c-a259-8da15e3061e5_621x384.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rmWn!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d70333f-ef2b-4d3c-a259-8da15e3061e5_621x384.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rmWn!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d70333f-ef2b-4d3c-a259-8da15e3061e5_621x384.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rmWn!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d70333f-ef2b-4d3c-a259-8da15e3061e5_621x384.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rmWn!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d70333f-ef2b-4d3c-a259-8da15e3061e5_621x384.png" width="621" height="384" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/8d70333f-ef2b-4d3c-a259-8da15e3061e5_621x384.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:384,&quot;width&quot;:621,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rmWn!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d70333f-ef2b-4d3c-a259-8da15e3061e5_621x384.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rmWn!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d70333f-ef2b-4d3c-a259-8da15e3061e5_621x384.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rmWn!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d70333f-ef2b-4d3c-a259-8da15e3061e5_621x384.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rmWn!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d70333f-ef2b-4d3c-a259-8da15e3061e5_621x384.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>For example, the researchers findings that multinationals reduced their sale in third countries when there were Chinese output tariffs on the U.S. and when there were U.S. input tariffs on China is consistent with their theory that the U.S. creates <em>complementary</em> goods to the third countries in the dataset since both of these tariffs raise prices for U.S. companies: the former through raising prices to offset the Chinese tax and the latter by raising domestic production costs. The inverse follows, showing multinationals increased their sale in third countries when there were U.S. output tariffs on China and when there were Chinese input tariffs on the U.S. This supports that China creates <em>substitution</em> goods to the third countries in the dataset since both of these tariffs&#8217; influence market redirections away from China, displaying their competitive nature: the former by China switching from selling to the U.S. to third countries and the latter by raising production cost within China, causing third country fill-in. The tariffs effect on employment and number of firms was not significant but followed the same pattern. </p><p>Those trends mostly describe the behavior of MNCs and their affiliates. The researchers turn to third-country exports to explain the shifts they take across the different kind of tariffs. This omits the U.S. and China, and tracks whether third country exports would increase or decrease to the U.S. and China. Chinese output tariffs on the U.S. significantly decreased third country exports to China, while Chinese input tariffs on the U.S. significantly increased third country exports to China. The former is explained again by third countries making complementary goods to the U.S., since as the tariff forces a U.S. shift away from expensive Chinese goods, the third countries follow. The latter is explained by Chinese substitutional goods being supplemented by third countries as prices increase. </p><p>Looking at U.S. tariffs, third country exports to the U.S. increased when there were U.S. output tariffs on China and decreased to the U.S. (and to all) when there were U.S. input tariffs on China. The former is explained by higher prices on substitutional Chinese goods causing U.S. companies to prefer cheaper third countries goods, and the latter is explained by higher production costs in the U.S. cause third country complementary products to follow the loss in prices/demand. All of these findings pair closely with the behavior of MNCs, though the specificities of where trade flows are integral to understanding the behavior of third countries. </p><p>International trade is complicated. Multiple different actors and products flowing in countless different directions makes getting a grasp on its functions and patterns incredibly difficult. Despite complexities, a few key findings give more shape to the amorphousness of trade. Most importantly, the trade war&#8217;s effects on third countries largely canceled out, leaving a net effect that was slightly negative and not statistically significant. This flat number hides much of the movement happening underneath. The on-net neutral effect is consistent with the fact that tariffs on products and tariffs on inputs pushed in opposite directions due to the U.S. creating complementary goods to third countries, while China made substitutional goods. The researchers found that multinationals were more affected by tariffs than third countries domestic firms, proving that most of the shifts in supply chains were done by MNCs. This gives policymakers and researchers an easier frame of reference to understand trade as primarily conducted by MNCs, and the effects of tariffs at a globally <em>reactive</em> scale. The old framework of a U.S.-China two-player tariff battle is inaccurate in an increasingly interconnected world. Rather than a two-player game, trade should be viewed as a multiplayer free-for-all, with third countries and MNCs trying to find the best position in global supply chains in accordance with U.S.-Chinese tariffs.  U.S.-Chinese tariffs.  </p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Fairness Paradox: How Firms' Supply-Chain Shifts Both Help and Hurt Their Economic and Political Output]]></title><description><![CDATA[Analysis by Lena Hasiuk.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/the-fairness-paradox-how-firms-supply</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/the-fairness-paradox-how-firms-supply</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 14:00:15 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rc5s!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F53a11805-9c08-4d39-9e6b-0226caabcb5d_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rc5s!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F53a11805-9c08-4d39-9e6b-0226caabcb5d_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rc5s!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F53a11805-9c08-4d39-9e6b-0226caabcb5d_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rc5s!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F53a11805-9c08-4d39-9e6b-0226caabcb5d_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rc5s!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F53a11805-9c08-4d39-9e6b-0226caabcb5d_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rc5s!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F53a11805-9c08-4d39-9e6b-0226caabcb5d_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rc5s!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F53a11805-9c08-4d39-9e6b-0226caabcb5d_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rc5s!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F53a11805-9c08-4d39-9e6b-0226caabcb5d_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rc5s!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F53a11805-9c08-4d39-9e6b-0226caabcb5d_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rc5s!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F53a11805-9c08-4d39-9e6b-0226caabcb5d_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rc5s!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F53a11805-9c08-4d39-9e6b-0226caabcb5d_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Following the Second World War, the economy has decidedly shifted toward a model of globalization built on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (later the World Trade Organization), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. The United States plays a key role in this economic interdependence, with the U.S. dollar as the world&#8217;s dominant reserve currency, thus American firms hold significant economic and political influence. Although it&#8217;s common understanding that firms have varying levels of domestic political influence, scholars lack a unified consensus on the exact causal mechanisms, especially in the context of the turbulent economic environment of the 2020s.</p><p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818325100581">In &#8220;Supplying Influence: Domestic Production Networks in Trade Politics</a>,&#8221; Timm Betz (Washington University in St. Louis) and Leonhard Hummel (Technical University of Munich) propose that globalization may be a double-edged sword. Writing in the Summer 2025 issue of International Organization, they argue that although global supply chains help firms stay competitive, moving production away from domestic suppliers erodes the domestic constituency behind those firms. This results in firms with the largest domestic production networks exhibiting more political influence. Politicians exhibit higher levels of support for domestically integrated firms, which is demonstrated through the approval of their anti-dumping petitions and the number of members of Congress who sign briefs on their behalf.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p>Betz and Hummel propose a three-part theory to explain this phenomenon. The first part concerns firms&#8217; coalition size and breadth. When a firm can garner support from a greater swath of constituents across different industries, occupations, and constituencies, that translates into more political support. For example, if a tire company can tap into not only their direct employees, but also the employees of the rubber, steel-cord, and chemical suppliers that depend on selling to them, they can have a larger political output. What matters is how large a share of those suppliers&#8217; output the firm buys. The second concerns firms&#8217; economic geography. Firms whose suppliers are spread across many locations thus economically affect a greater number of politicians&#8217; constituents, even when the firm itself is concentrated in one place. Therefore, when they need a petition approved, they can bank on the support of a broader set of representatives because of the vast support network they have accrued. The final part concerns firms&#8217; narrative control. Firms and their allies utilize rhetorical spin to convince commissioners, congresspeople, and constituents to support their desires. Often, this is done by framing protection as restoring fair trade, with benefits shared by domestic firms and workers across industries rather than concentrated in one company.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z0RI!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb1d300f7-6528-42f1-af73-55961358d445_714x507.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z0RI!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb1d300f7-6528-42f1-af73-55961358d445_714x507.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z0RI!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb1d300f7-6528-42f1-af73-55961358d445_714x507.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z0RI!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb1d300f7-6528-42f1-af73-55961358d445_714x507.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z0RI!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb1d300f7-6528-42f1-af73-55961358d445_714x507.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z0RI!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb1d300f7-6528-42f1-af73-55961358d445_714x507.png" width="714" height="507" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/b1d300f7-6528-42f1-af73-55961358d445_714x507.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:507,&quot;width&quot;:714,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z0RI!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb1d300f7-6528-42f1-af73-55961358d445_714x507.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z0RI!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb1d300f7-6528-42f1-af73-55961358d445_714x507.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z0RI!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb1d300f7-6528-42f1-af73-55961358d445_714x507.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z0RI!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb1d300f7-6528-42f1-af73-55961358d445_714x507.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>To find the empirical support, the authors collected data from three main sources. First, they collected data on U.S. anti-dumping petitions. They drew this anti-dumping petition data from the Global Anti-Dumping Database from 1992-2019, examining 918 petitions from ~700 petitioners covering about 2,000 products. Dumping is when international firms sell goods below cost and/or the home market price. An anti-dumping petition is filed with the government by firms (and sometimes unions) to request an anti-dumping duty. These duties&#8217; primary goal is to act as short-term relief for domestic firms impacted by dumping. When a firm decides to apply, they file the petition with both the Department of Commerce, which determines whether the goods are being sold below fair value, and the International Trade Commission (ITC), which determines whether the imports harm the U.S. industry; both must rule in the firm&#8217;s favor. Anti-dumping petitions act as a good measure of political influence because although the ITC is independent and bipartisan on paper, in reality, the president appoints its commissioners, who require Senate confirmation, and the Secretary of Commerce serves at the president&#8217;s pleasure. Congress holds the final say on the ITC&#8217;s budget, and if commissioners act in a way lawmakers do not approve of, they can face uncomfortable congressional hearings. When their careers (and budgets) are on the line, commissioners have good reason to act in accordance with those in power.</p><p>Second, they drew upon input-output data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis&#8217; Use Tables and Total Requirements Tables from 1997-2017. This account of over 600,000 customer&#8211;supplier relationships between industries both records how much each industry buys from every other industry and provides the amount of dollars needed from one industry, including inputs to those inputs, to produce one dollar of output from another, respectively. Last, they integrated firm-level data from Orbis, providing information on firm ownership, multinational status, and stock listing.</p><p>With this data, they constructed their test. The authors measured the success rate of the anti-dumping petitions against three versions of their key measure: first, a baseline measure of how much of its direct suppliers&#8217; output a firm&#8217;s industry absorbs (Eta); second, a measure that also counts suppliers&#8217; own suppliers throughout the economy (Eta-Total); last, a measure that strips out imported inputs to isolate domestic suppliers (Eta-M). Throughout these tests, they controlled for known predictors of petition success. In the standard model, this controls for industry size, change in imports, steel-product dummy, campaign contributions, non-market economy status, presidential election years, and time trends. In an expanded model, they control for multinational status, stock listing, real exchange rate, fixed assets, and NAICS three-digit industry fixed effects.</p><p>The results support their hypothesis. When a firm moved from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of the baseline measure, there was a 20 percentage-point increase, from 62 to 82 percent, in the probability that an anti-dumping petition was approved. In addition, they found that when firms shifted more of their inputs abroad, making them less reliant on domestic suppliers, there was a decline in approval rate for anti-dumping petitions. The pattern held when comparing different products from the same firm, and when using exchange-rate swings to trace shifts in sourcing. Petitions tied to larger domestic networks also drew more support in Congress: about twenty more signatures on briefs to the ITC. This means that the larger the share of domestic suppliers&#8217; output a firm absorbs, the more they can draw on the favor of politicians to approve their petition requests. This supports the double-edged sword. Sure, firms can outsource their supply chains internationally, but when they do, they lose the political leverage that comes from a coalition of domestic suppliers.</p><p>Betz and Hummel&#8217;s research has significant implications given the weight of swing states in American politics. The authors find that 25 to 35 percent of the effect runs through suppliers&#8217; employment in swing states. With rust belt swing states central to the 2016, 2020, and 2024 presidential elections, and going into a politically turbulent and polarized election season in 2026 and 2028, that channel matters. Now, scholars can refer to either their research methods or their theorization of firm political influence to more accurately predict and analyze the way firms&#8217; domestic political influence shapes the political strategies of campaigns and their success/failure. The theoretical and methodological work provides ample resources to draw upon and to spur new investigations into domestic firms in the political sphere.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Who Gets to Call It Economic Security?]]></title><description><![CDATA[Filtering Special Interests: How Institutions Shape the Politics of Trade Securitization]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/who-gets-to-call-it-economic-security</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/who-gets-to-call-it-economic-security</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 14:15:26 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lhGj!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fef6c59be-583b-4319-a9de-a50c45b1bf47_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lhGj!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fef6c59be-583b-4319-a9de-a50c45b1bf47_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lhGj!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fef6c59be-583b-4319-a9de-a50c45b1bf47_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lhGj!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fef6c59be-583b-4319-a9de-a50c45b1bf47_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lhGj!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fef6c59be-583b-4319-a9de-a50c45b1bf47_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lhGj!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fef6c59be-583b-4319-a9de-a50c45b1bf47_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lhGj!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fef6c59be-583b-4319-a9de-a50c45b1bf47_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/ef6c59be-583b-4319-a9de-a50c45b1bf47_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1455291,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/218118103?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fef6c59be-583b-4319-a9de-a50c45b1bf47_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lhGj!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fef6c59be-583b-4319-a9de-a50c45b1bf47_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lhGj!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fef6c59be-583b-4319-a9de-a50c45b1bf47_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lhGj!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fef6c59be-583b-4319-a9de-a50c45b1bf47_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lhGj!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fef6c59be-583b-4319-a9de-a50c45b1bf47_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Original article is <a href="https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/items/e1f5c366-c947-46b5-9370-e2324434d7ee">Filtering Special Interests: How Institutions Shape the Politics of Trade Securitization</a>. </p><p>How do states decide what products are and aren&#8217;t important to national security? Democracies across the world are increasingly restricting trade in the name of "economic security." But how do state decide what products are and aren&#8217;t important to national security? Almost anything can be framed as a vulnerability because around 40 percent of globally traded products have 90 percent of their exports concentrated in three or fewer economies. Every chokepoint that gets tariffed or has a subsidy to alleviate it creates new winners and losers with consumers paying higher prices. So how do democracies decide what products are and are not important to their national security? <br>&#9;A new dissertation by Timothy Cichanowicz (University of Kansas, now the Japan Foundation Postdoctoral Fellow at Harvard's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs) argues that the answer depends on political institutions. Existing research usually explains trade securitization in terms of high and low politics. The high-politics view says states should restrict products they depend on heavily and can't easily replace. The low-politics view says any redistributive policies will be influenced heavily by domestic interests. Cichanowicz argues that both forces operate at once, and that the context of where these debates play out determines which force is stronger. Presidential systems like the United States have many access points, which let interest groups rebrand sectoral protection as a security imperative and broaden what counts as "economic security." Parliamentary systems like Japan have fewer access points and stronger bureaucratic gatekeepers, which filter out those demands and produce narrower, more technocratic outcomes. <br>&#9;To test this, Cichanowicz compares three cases. The first is the contemporary U.S. Congress. He built an original dataset of every China-related trade securitization bill introduced from 2018 to 2024 and matched the bills to the roughly 6,900 products the U.S. imported from and exported to China at the HS 6-digit level. For each of these products he then measures their dependency on China, its exit cost, and the strength of China-related lobbying in the U.S. Trade Representative. The second case is Japan's Economic Security Promotion Act where he drew on government documents as well as 33 interviews with policymakers, industry representatives, and experts, conducted in Japanese and English during the summer of 2025. The third is how Congress responded to Japan's economic rise by using International Trade Commission reports from 1973 to 1994, trade data, and archival Congressional correspondence from the Dole Institute of Politics.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!V73L!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fba6eb74b-807f-4942-b508-68c0dc8c4b0c_936x646.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!V73L!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fba6eb74b-807f-4942-b508-68c0dc8c4b0c_936x646.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!V73L!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fba6eb74b-807f-4942-b508-68c0dc8c4b0c_936x646.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!V73L!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fba6eb74b-807f-4942-b508-68c0dc8c4b0c_936x646.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!V73L!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fba6eb74b-807f-4942-b508-68c0dc8c4b0c_936x646.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!V73L!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fba6eb74b-807f-4942-b508-68c0dc8c4b0c_936x646.png" width="936" height="646" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/ba6eb74b-807f-4942-b508-68c0dc8c4b0c_936x646.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:646,&quot;width&quot;:936,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!V73L!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fba6eb74b-807f-4942-b508-68c0dc8c4b0c_936x646.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!V73L!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fba6eb74b-807f-4942-b508-68c0dc8c4b0c_936x646.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!V73L!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fba6eb74b-807f-4942-b508-68c0dc8c4b0c_936x646.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!V73L!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fba6eb74b-807f-4942-b508-68c0dc8c4b0c_936x646.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>The U.S. results cut against a pure national security story. Products with both high dependency on China and high exit costs, the textbook chokepoints, were actually <em>less</em> likely to appear in securitizing legislation. Conversely, the products securitized by Japan&#8217;s Economic Security Promotion Act were those that had high levels of exit cost. While the U.S. case featured hundreds of products debated by Congress, Japan&#8217;s law narrowly designated 12 critical material categories. Six were chokepoints such as fertilizer, antimicrobials, and permanent magnets. Four were chokepoints that Japan sought to protect, such as machine tools and ship parts. Two, semiconductors and storage batteries, fit both descriptions. Interviewees reported that industry proposals for copper, aluminum, and corn starch were rejected. Requests had to survive multiple ministries and committees, and the Ministry of Finance served as an internal veto point. Whereas products like aluminum dominate U.S. discourse, rejection of such requests in Japan was the norm. <br>&#9;The 1980s U.S.&#8211;Japan case tests these dynamics temporally by showing how a perceived rival opens the door for domestic interests. Cichanowicz measures demand for protection against Japan but finds that industry demand for protection against Japan stayed fairly constant from 1973 to 1994. Despite this consistency, Congressional interest in trade protection did not activate until Japan was seen as a threat to American economic dominance. Archival letters show groups like beef producers lobbying to get their products onto the U.S.&#8211;Japan trade agenda. Meanwhile, U.S. dependence on Japan for the most-discussed products was already falling before securitization peaked. These findings suggest that for the U.S., economic security threats are an opportunity for special interests to leverage such debates to benefit from market intervention that would not have occurred without the emergence of a status threat. <br>&#9;The implications of this study have key ramifications for consumers and policymakers alike. In power-sharing systems like the United States, technocrats trying to design targeted de-risking policy face an uphill battle because the same system that makes economic security salient also invites opportunistic rent-seeking. Congress matters here too: its bills, even failed ones, often signal priorities the executive later acts on. For ordinary citizens, each product placed behind a &#8220;high fence&#8221; is one they will pay more for, whether that be through hiked prices or higher taxes.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Power and Plenty Were Never a Trade-Off ]]></title><description><![CDATA[Analysis by Charlie Andrade. Part of the Classic Series.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/power-and-plenty-were-never-a-trade</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/power-and-plenty-were-never-a-trade</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 14:01:20 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qSxG!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8b635b98-df99-461c-9ac3-8c12b884f329_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qSxG!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8b635b98-df99-461c-9ac3-8c12b884f329_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qSxG!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8b635b98-df99-461c-9ac3-8c12b884f329_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qSxG!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8b635b98-df99-461c-9ac3-8c12b884f329_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qSxG!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8b635b98-df99-461c-9ac3-8c12b884f329_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qSxG!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8b635b98-df99-461c-9ac3-8c12b884f329_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qSxG!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8b635b98-df99-461c-9ac3-8c12b884f329_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/8b635b98-df99-461c-9ac3-8c12b884f329_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:2669315,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/217074582?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8b635b98-df99-461c-9ac3-8c12b884f329_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qSxG!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8b635b98-df99-461c-9ac3-8c12b884f329_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qSxG!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8b635b98-df99-461c-9ac3-8c12b884f329_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qSxG!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8b635b98-df99-461c-9ac3-8c12b884f329_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qSxG!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8b635b98-df99-461c-9ac3-8c12b884f329_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>Every round of the current trade war forces the same choice. A government can chase prosperity, open markets, and let supply chains find the cheapest producer, or it can chase security, wall off strategic industries, and pay the price. Tariffs, export controls, and new economic security pacts demand that governments choose either wealth or power. The dilemma sounds like a product of the present, but it echoes a much older argument in economic history: whether wealth and power were ever really rivals. Three centuries ago, statesmen wrestled with a version of the same question, and one economist&#8217;s answer to it is still worth reading today.</span></p><p><span>Mercantilism, the body of trade doctrine that guided European statecraft before Adam Smith, has long been read by historians as a system organized around power, in which a ruler hoarded bullion and weakened his rivals to strengthen the state. At the same time, wealth served only as a means, the treasure that funded the fleets and the soldiers. That reading became the standard consensus: power came first, wealth second. But did the mercantilists actually treat wealth and power as rivals, or has that assumption said more about later interpreters than about the mercantilists themselves? In &#8220;</span><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2009156"><span>Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries</span></a><span>,&#8221; Jacob Viner (Princeton University) challenges this consensus about mercantilism. Writing in the inaugural 1948 issue of World Politics, Viner argued that the mercantilists never ranked the two goals against each other; in their thinking, power and plenty were joint aims of national policy, each expected to reinforce the other.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2y5L!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F072fa109-ba7c-4640-bb7a-61e01503727a_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2y5L!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F072fa109-ba7c-4640-bb7a-61e01503727a_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2y5L!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F072fa109-ba7c-4640-bb7a-61e01503727a_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2y5L!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F072fa109-ba7c-4640-bb7a-61e01503727a_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2y5L!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F072fa109-ba7c-4640-bb7a-61e01503727a_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img 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data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/072fa109-ba7c-4640-bb7a-61e01503727a_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:171153,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/217074582?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F072fa109-ba7c-4640-bb7a-61e01503727a_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2y5L!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F072fa109-ba7c-4640-bb7a-61e01503727a_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2y5L!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F072fa109-ba7c-4640-bb7a-61e01503727a_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2y5L!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F072fa109-ba7c-4640-bb7a-61e01503727a_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2y5L!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F072fa109-ba7c-4640-bb7a-61e01503727a_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>Viner read the mercantilists more closely than earlier interpreters had, but he didn&#8217;t dismiss their critiques outright. He agreed that mercantilist writers treated wealth as a means to power, and that they overstate how much strength a full treasury could buy. But he pushed the original interpreter&#8217;s argument further. Could anyone actually point to a single mercantilist who called power the sole purpose of policy, or dismissed wealth as worthless apart from the weapons it bought? Heckscher, the historian whose work had established that power-first consensus, knew the sources well, yet he never cited such a line from a mercantilist, and Viner doubted one existed.</span></p><p><span>Viner&#8217;s investigation found that much of the evidence for the power-first reading was thin. Heckscher had leaned heavily on a single line from Colbert, the finance minister of Louis XIV, who wrote that trade is the source of finance, and finance is the sinew of war, the muscle behind every army. Read alone, that line does make commerce sound like a tool of the army. But Colbert also wrote that a good prince puts his subjects&#8217; welfare first, and much mercantilist writing discusses trade and prosperity without ever mentioning war. Viner made a simple point about evidence like this. Silence cuts both ways. If Colbert believed finance was the sinew of war, he would just as easily have said that strength was the sinew of trade.</span></p><p><span>The mercantilists&#8217; real error, Viner argued, was economic, not political. Many of them treated the world&#8217;s wealth as fixed, much like its stock of gold, so one country could only grow richer by making another poorer. Adam Smith mocked this view, in which nations treated a neighbor&#8217;s gains as their own losses and grew suspicious of trade that might otherwise have connected them, but a bad theory of wealth is not the same as a preference for power over wealth. Viner&#8217;s point was that the mercantilists misunderstood how nations grow rich, not that they cared more about strength than riches.</span></p><p><span>This is where Viner actually answers the question by rejecting the premise that a side had to be picked in the first place. Power and plenty, he argued, were joint aims that mercantilist statesmen expected to reinforce each other, and the language of the era backs him up. Phrases like &#8220;power and plenty,&#8221; &#8220;wealth and strength,&#8221; &#8220;profit and power,&#8221; and &#8220;profit and security&#8221; appear again and again in the poems, pamphlets, statutes, and war declarations of the time. Even Adam Smith, mercantilism&#8217;s harshest critic, granted that the great aim of a country&#8217;s political economy was to enlarge its riches and its power together.</span></p><p><span>Viner&#8217;s account has one important limit worth naming. He never claimed the two aims always lined up. Statesmen sometimes had to spend on defense money they could have put into trade, and they knew it. Most writers of the period thought the sacrifice paid off in the end, since a secure country was best placed to prosper. Smith later coined the harder line that &#8220;defense is more important than opulence,&#8221; opulence being Smith&#8217;s word for prosperity, a ranking the mercantilists themselves never put so bluntly. They would have said instead that defense and prosperity depend on each other, even when the two seem, for a time, to compete.</span></p><p><span>The false choice Viner rejected has not gone away. Talk of guns versus butter, the modern shorthand for choosing between military spending and domestic prosperity, assumes exactly the ranking of power over wealth that he showed the mercantilists never held. For them, the question barely arose, because a nation needed both wealth and power and pursued them together. Their real problem was economic: a zero-sum view of trade, the belief that one country&#8217;s gain always means another&#8217;s loss, which set nations against one another instead of connecting them. Viner closed his 1948 essay with a brief aside, noting that this faulty economics had poisoned relations between states, and that the harm had reached into his own time. Three-quarters of a century later, the same faulty economics is back in plainer view: tariffs, export controls, and &#8220;de-risking&#8221; pacts are all built on the assumption that a country must trade away either its wealth or its security. The mercantilists wanted their nations rich and strong at once. What outlived them, by three centuries and counting, is the belief that a country can only prosper by impoverishing its neighbors, and Viner&#8217;s answer- that the choice was never as real as it looked- is worth taking seriously the next time a government insists it has to be made.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Why Wall Street Rewards Companies That Lobby ]]></title><description><![CDATA[Analysis by Ines Aliche.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/why-wall-street-rewards-companies</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/why-wall-street-rewards-companies</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 13:59:47 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MBLh!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde6e6aaa-bcd2-4e21-a324-333e36b0eca6_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MBLh!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde6e6aaa-bcd2-4e21-a324-333e36b0eca6_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MBLh!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde6e6aaa-bcd2-4e21-a324-333e36b0eca6_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MBLh!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde6e6aaa-bcd2-4e21-a324-333e36b0eca6_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MBLh!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde6e6aaa-bcd2-4e21-a324-333e36b0eca6_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MBLh!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde6e6aaa-bcd2-4e21-a324-333e36b0eca6_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MBLh!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde6e6aaa-bcd2-4e21-a324-333e36b0eca6_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/de6e6aaa-bcd2-4e21-a324-333e36b0eca6_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:2269193,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/215861759?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde6e6aaa-bcd2-4e21-a324-333e36b0eca6_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MBLh!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde6e6aaa-bcd2-4e21-a324-333e36b0eca6_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MBLh!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde6e6aaa-bcd2-4e21-a324-333e36b0eca6_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MBLh!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde6e6aaa-bcd2-4e21-a324-333e36b0eca6_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MBLh!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde6e6aaa-bcd2-4e21-a324-333e36b0eca6_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>Every four years, thousands of companies brace for the same event: a presidential election that could rewrite the rules they operate under overnight. Tax breaks might vanish, tariffs might appear, or existing regulations might flip. Firms can try to influence which candidate wins, but it turns out many of them have found another way to manage it, paying lobbyists.</span></p><p><span>A </span><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70043"><span>recent paper</span></a><span> by Kristy Buzard, Nathan Canen, and Sebastian Saiegh (of Syracuse University, the University of Warwick, and UC San Diego) finds that firms that lobby experience significantly less anticipated stock market turbulence around elections than firms that don&#8217;t. Rather than relying on news coverage or surveys to measure this, the researchers built a new indicator from the options market, watching how investors themselves priced the uncertainty of individual companies in the days surrounding the 2020 presidential election. What they found is that the market treats lobbying firms as safer bets, and that this pattern holds up even after accounting for standard reasons some firms lobby and others don&#8217;t.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p><span>To measure firm-level political risk, the researchers resorted to a corner of the stock market that trades entirely on expectations: options. An options price reflects how much investors think a stock could move before the option expires, so by comparing options that expire just after the election to those that expire well after, the researchers could isolate how much volatility they were pricing in specifically due to the election. They ran this exercise for roughly 2,500 publicly traded firms with data pulled from OptionMetrics, then merged it with lobbying outlay records from the LobbyView database to see whether a firm had spent money trying to influence policy in the four quarters before the election (Q3 2019 through Q2 2020).</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uqGV!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2ad4d461-805b-4135-b6fe-103dd589d7be_341x448.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uqGV!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2ad4d461-805b-4135-b6fe-103dd589d7be_341x448.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uqGV!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2ad4d461-805b-4135-b6fe-103dd589d7be_341x448.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uqGV!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2ad4d461-805b-4135-b6fe-103dd589d7be_341x448.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uqGV!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2ad4d461-805b-4135-b6fe-103dd589d7be_341x448.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uqGV!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2ad4d461-805b-4135-b6fe-103dd589d7be_341x448.png" width="341" height="448" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/2ad4d461-805b-4135-b6fe-103dd589d7be_341x448.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:448,&quot;width&quot;:341,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uqGV!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2ad4d461-805b-4135-b6fe-103dd589d7be_341x448.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uqGV!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2ad4d461-805b-4135-b6fe-103dd589d7be_341x448.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uqGV!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2ad4d461-805b-4135-b6fe-103dd589d7be_341x448.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uqGV!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2ad4d461-805b-4135-b6fe-103dd589d7be_341x448.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>Firms that lobbied had &#8220;policy risk&#8221; scores 11.5% to 21.9% lower than the average firm in the sample. Policy risk is the researchers&#8217; term for how much post-election turbulence investors expected in a firm&#8217;s stock price, estimated by comparing options prices in the days before the vote. Investors expected calmer waters ahead for firms that lobbied than for similar firms that didn&#8217;t. That gap held up even after the researchers controlled for size, industry, financial health, and dozens of other political variables like PAC contributions and revolving door hires. So, it wasn&#8217;t simply that lobbying firms happened to be bigger or more stable to begin with. The effect also grew with the size of a firm&#8217;s lobbying budget. The more money a company spent on lobbying, the calmer investors expected its stock to be. Firms that spent the most on lobbying saw about a 13.77% drop in anticipated post-election swings compared to firms that didn&#8217;t lobby at all.</span></p><p><span>The paper&#8217;s more interesting contribution explains why this pattern exists in the first place. Lobbying firms and non-lobbying firms are not identical to begin with. In the sample, lobbying firms tended to be larger, older, more profitable, and already more politically active than firms that skipped lobbying. That raises an obvious question. Maybe these firms simply look calmer to investors because they are bigger and sturdier, not because lobbying itself changes anything. To test this, the authors built a statistical model that accounts for the fact that firms choose to lobby only when they expect it to pay off. Even after doing this, lobbying was still linked to meaningfully lower anticipated volatility. If anything, the effect got larger once this selection process was taken into account.</span></p><p><span>From there, the paper turns to a bigger question. Why do only some firms bother lobbying at all? Since the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act, firms have had to publicly report how much they spend on lobbying. In this dataset, only about 32% of firms did so ahead of the 2020 election. To explain that gap, the authors build a model that treats lobbying like a costly bet. A firm has to pay a fixed cost just to enter the lobbying game, plus a variable cost that rises with how intensely it lobbies. Whether that bet pays off depends on what the authors call a firm&#8217;s &#8220;lobbying favorability,&#8221; essentially how much political access, connections, or existing privilege a firm can draw on. The researchers estimate the fixed cost at around $12,500, which lines up closely with what real Washington lobbying firms charge as a minimum retainer. They also find that the payoff from lobbying shrinks quickly. Each additional dollar spent buys progressively less protection.</span></p><p><span>This helps explain a longstanding puzzle in political science. Despite how much money appears to be at stake in Washington, most companies still choose not to lobby. The paper&#8217;s answer is that the payoff from lobbying is highly skewed. A small set of firms, generally larger ones with more to protect, see returns that clearly justify the cost. Everyone else looks at the price tag and decides to take their chances with the election instead. The authors are careful about the limits of their evidence. Because the study focuses specifically on elections, it does not capture other sources of policy uncertainty, like regulatory risk from federal agencies, that operate through different channels. Still, by tying a firm&#8217;s lobbying decision directly to a measurable drop in investor uncertainty, the paper offers a rare, quantifiable window into whether lobbying actually works.</span></p><p><span>The authors connect their findings to two bigger debates. The first is a longstanding puzzle in political science. If lobbying really buys this much protection, why doesn&#8217;t every firm do it? The skewed and quickly diminishing payoffs documented here help answer that. The second is the ongoing debate over restricting lobbying. If lobbying works like insurance against election related risk, then limiting it could leave firms, and by extension their shareholders and employees, more exposed to the swings of American elections, not less protected. For roughly a third of American firms, the ones with the most to protect, the market seems to agree that the insurance premium is worth paying.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Bringing the U.S.-China Trade War Simulation Online ]]></title><description><![CDATA[Dear readers,]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/bringing-the-us-china-trade-war-simulation</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/bringing-the-us-china-trade-war-simulation</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 14:37:09 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MQC1!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd72ae6d9-a4fb-49ed-8b19-e921523d8c52_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MQC1!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd72ae6d9-a4fb-49ed-8b19-e921523d8c52_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MQC1!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd72ae6d9-a4fb-49ed-8b19-e921523d8c52_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MQC1!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd72ae6d9-a4fb-49ed-8b19-e921523d8c52_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MQC1!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd72ae6d9-a4fb-49ed-8b19-e921523d8c52_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MQC1!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd72ae6d9-a4fb-49ed-8b19-e921523d8c52_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MQC1!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd72ae6d9-a4fb-49ed-8b19-e921523d8c52_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MQC1!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd72ae6d9-a4fb-49ed-8b19-e921523d8c52_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MQC1!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd72ae6d9-a4fb-49ed-8b19-e921523d8c52_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MQC1!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd72ae6d9-a4fb-49ed-8b19-e921523d8c52_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MQC1!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd72ae6d9-a4fb-49ed-8b19-e921523d8c52_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Dear readers,<br>This week, we&#8217;re excited to introduce a new learning tool and coding project our lab has been working on! The U.S.-China Trade War Simulation teaches students how domestic politics shapes international bargaining through an active learning model. Students step into the middle of the 2018&#8211;2020 U.S.-China Trade War and experience firsthand the challenges of negotiating across both domestic and international political constraints.<br></p><p>In this post, we&#8217;ll walk through how the simulation works, how we&#8217;ve designed it to fit into the classroom, and what we learned building the web app that now brings it online. At the end, we&#8217;ve also attached a sample lesson plan for instructors interested in bringing the simulation into their own classrooms.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p><br><strong>Interested in the research behind the simulation?</strong> We are also using the simulation as a research tool to study bargaining, issue linkage, and the conditions that contribute to bargaining failure. Our paper, <em>&#8220;Issue Linkage and Bargaining Failure: Experimental Evidence from a Trade War Simulation,&#8221;</em> examines the experimental data generated through the simulation and is currently under review. If you&#8217;d like to learn more about the research behind the project, you can read the print <a href="https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.15114.63681"><span>here</span></a>.</p><p><em><strong><span>At a Glance</span></strong></em></p><p><span>&#183; It works best for intro IR, IPE, U.S.&#8211;China relations, or bargaining courses.</span></p><p><span>&#183; Expect about 2 to 4 class hours depending on format, plus 1 to 2 hours of prep.</span></p><p><span>&#183; Runs in person, over Zoom, or as a hybrid.</span></p><p><span>&#183; The class needs at least </span><em><span>six </span></em><span>students, though it works best with around twelve.</span></p><p><span>&#183; Instructor prep is minimal. Just read through our briefing slide deck and get familiar with the web app.</span></p><p><span>&#183; Students should do a short role briefing, watch the Frontline documentary, and can write an optional policy memo.</span></p><p><span>&#183; All you need is a web browser. No special software required.</span></p><p><span>&#183; It&#8217;s free.</span></p><p><span>&#183; You can explore the simulation at </span><a href="https://simulation.tradewarlab.com/"><span>simulation.tradewarlab.com.</span></a></p><p><em><strong><span>How the Simulation Works</span></strong></em></p><p><span>The simulation unfolds in two rounds.</span></p><p><span>Round 1, Domestic Politics. Students are divided into U.S. and Chinese teams. Within each country team, students are assigned to an interest group representing a different domestic constituency, either a Globalist, a Protectionist, or a National Security Hawk. Each group receives a policy document outlining its priorities, including which issues, such as tariffs, market access, and technology transfer, matter most to them. Groups then negotiate among themselves and aggregate their preferences into a position paper that becomes their team&#8217;s mandate for international negotiations.</span></p><p><span>Round 2, International Negotiation. Armed with that mandate, the U.S. and Chinese teams sit down across the table from each other&#8217;s negotiators. They bargain over a joint statement, trading asks and concessions on a shared points scale and trying to reach a deal before time runs out.</span></p><p><em><strong><span>Why It Teaches Bargaining Theory</span></strong></em></p><p><span>This structure is built around two foundational IR ideas, two-level games (Putnam) and bargaining theory (Fearon). In a two-level game, negotiators must simultaneously satisfy international counterparts and domestic constituencies. Bargaining theory asks why actors sometimes fail to reach agreements that would leave both sides better off than conflict. Fearon&#8217;s model was developed to explain military conflict, but the same bargaining logic helps students understand why mutually costly trade disputes can persist.</span></p><p><span>Every negotiator in a two-level game is effectively bargaining at two tables at once, one with their international counterpart, the other with constituencies back home. For most students, these are ideas first encountered as abstractions in an Introduction to International Relations textbook. Here, they get to experience them instead of just reading about them.</span></p><p><span>That experience is what makes the constraints of international bargaining tangible. The tension of international politics becomes apparent when the demands of a domestic coalition leave a negotiator with little room to make the concessions necessary to reach an international agreement. A bargaining range is easy to draw on a whiteboard, but much harder to locate when your own side refuses to move. Students watch their bargaining position take shape in real time, seeing how domestic constraints can narrow the potential range between two teams, and when negotiations end without a deal, they see firsthand how the disappearance of mutually acceptable agreements can lead to bargaining failure. In this way, the simulation transforms bargaining theory from an abstract concept into a problem students have to navigate themselves.</span></p><p><em><strong><span>What the Web App Does for Instructors</span></strong></em></p><p><span>Classroom simulations have a long history in international relations teaching, and for good reason. They&#8217;re one of the best ways to turn abstract concepts into something students actively experience. That&#8217;s not just an impression from the classroom. A recent </span><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15512169.2023.2245511"><span>experimental study</span></a><span> tracking three years of an Introduction to International Relations course found that sections using simulations showed measurable gains in both engagement and objective academic performance compared to sections that used debates and discussions instead. But anyone who has run one knows they can also be a headache. Instructors have to distribute materials, track negotiations, calculate outcomes, collect student decisions, and make sense of it all afterward. We wanted to build something that took that burden off instructors&#8217; plates, a tool they could pick up, run with their own students, and reuse semester after semester without reinventing the wheel each time.</span></p><p><span>The instructor dashboard handles the administrative work. Role assignments, bargaining positions, votes, scoring, and final outcomes are all recorded automatically, so instructors spend less time tallying points and more time facilitating the simulation and leading the debrief.</span></p><p><span>What running it actually looks like. Instructors create a class and get a unique class code to share with students, who use it to sign up and create their own accounts. From there, the instructor assigns each student to an interest group and country. There&#8217;s no random sorting, so you can build balanced teams or hand a role to the student best suited for it. Once assigned, you control when each round opens and closes, and can watch negotiations unfold live on a progress dashboard rather than circling the room guessing who&#8217;s stuck. Scores are calculated automatically the moment a deal is struck in Round 2. If a student is absent, you can simply pull them out of that round&#8217;s role play without disrupting the rest of the class, and separate class codes let multiple sections run their own simulations at the same time. When the negotiating is done, the debrief is where it all comes together, the moment the synthesis of active learning actually happens.</span></p><p><span>The app also comes stocked with everything needed to run a full lesson. That includes briefing documents for each interest group, an optional NotebookLM that students can query for background material, and a link to the Frontline documentary that originally inspired the simulation. Our goal was simple. We wanted to make something engaging for students and practical for instructors to actually use.</span></p><p><span>On data and privacy. Data handling is covered under our terms of agreement and IRB consent policy.</span></p><p><em><strong><span>A Sample Lesson Plan</span></strong></em></p><p><span>Instructors have asked how the simulation can fit into an existing syllabus, so here&#8217;s a four-part structure we&#8217;ve used with success.</span></p><p><span>One week before the simulation, assign roles. Students receive their interest group assignments and a week to research their role. We recommend having them write a short policy memo outlining their group&#8217;s priorities and potential concessions before Round 1. Here is a briefing slide deck we created to help your class prepare.</span></p><div class="file-embed-wrapper" data-component-name="FileToDOM"><div class="file-embed-container-reader"><div class="file-embed-container-top"><image class="file-embed-thumbnail-default" src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Cy0!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack.com%2Fimg%2Fattachment_icon.svg"></image><div class="file-embed-details"><div class="file-embed-details-h1">Trade War Simulation Prep Slides</div><div class="file-embed-details-h2">657KB &#8729; PDF file</div></div><a class="file-embed-button wide" href="https://www.tradewarlab.com/api/v1/file/053a5c0b-87f9-4b87-aa2c-27313f397988.pdf"><span class="file-embed-button-text">Download</span></a></div><a class="file-embed-button narrow" href="https://www.tradewarlab.com/api/v1/file/053a5c0b-87f9-4b87-aa2c-27313f397988.pdf"><span class="file-embed-button-text">Download</span></a></div></div><p><span>Class 1, Round 1, Domestic Politics. (~50 minutes.) Interest groups meet, negotiate internally, and aggregate their preferences into a team position paper.</span></p><p><span>Class 2, Round 2, International Negotiation. Teams sit down with the opposing country and bargain over a joint statement using the mandate they developed in Round 1.</span></p><p><span>Class 3, Debrief. Connect the simulation back to the real U.S.&#8211;China trade war and use the experience to reinforce foundational concepts in international political economy and bargaining theory. A few questions that work well to anchor discussion.</span></p><p><span>Did the two teams have a bargaining range?</span></p><p><span>Which domestic constituencies constrained negotiators most?</span></p><p><span>Did negotiators accept agreements that some members of their coalition disliked?</span></p><p><span>Why did some negotiations succeed while others failed?</span></p><p><span>How did your experience resemble or differ from the actual U.S.&#8211;China negotiations?</span></p><p><span>The structure is flexible, too. The core simulation can be completed in about two hours in a single extended class session, or spread across several standard 50- or 75-minute class meetings. We&#8217;ve also run it many times over Zoom, so remote and hybrid classes are no obstacle.</span></p><p><em><strong><span>Want to Try It in Your Classroom?</span></strong></em></p><p><span>You can explore the simulation at </span><a href="https://simulation.tradewarlab.com/"><span>simulation.tradewarlab.com</span></a><span>. We&#8217;ve also put together an instructor guide, student briefing materials, and a sample lesson plan. If you&#8217;re interested in using it in a course, or would like us to walk you through the platform, get in touch with the Trade War Lab.</span></p><p><em><strong><span>Behind the Scenes: Building the App</span></strong></em></p><p><em><span>Everything above is the view from the classroom. But building the platform that makes it possible was its own kind of negotiation, between what we wanted and what we could actually ship. Below, Henry, the student developer who built the app, reflects on what that process taught him.</span></em></p><p><span>The web app grew out of a problem we ran into with the original, paper-based version of the simulation, where groups of students split into different rooms to negotiate. It worked, but it created real headaches for instructors. Tracking each team&#8217;s progress was difficult, collecting data afterward meant hours of manual work, and the whole format assumed everyone could be in the same room. As we ran more iterations, including remote versions over Zoom, those limitations became harder to ignore. Eventually it was clear that instead of forcing an existing platform to fit the simulation, we needed to build our own.</span></p><p><span>That gave us control over every part of the experience, letting us change the rules, adjust the interface, and respond directly to what we learned from each round of testing. The app runs on Vercel, Next.js, and Supabase, a stack simple enough for a small team (essentially one developer) to build and maintain while Supabase handled authentication, real-time updates, and the database behind the scenes.</span></p><p><span>Since we&#8217;re a research lab, though, the app also had to make the simulation easier to study. We built it to automatically record student decisions and the values they assign to different trade items, with everything exportable as a CSV. We also made final votes anonymous after early testing showed students were less likely to reject a bad deal when their name was attached to it. Anonymity lets students vote their actual judgment instead of caving to whoever negotiates the loudest. They can still see whether a deal passed unanimously, just not who voted which way. These priorities shaped the technical choices, too. We wanted the app to feel professional without becoming one more piece of software students and instructors had to learn. That&#8217;s part of why we chose Supabase&#8217;s relational structure over something like MongoDB. The simulation itself is inherently relational, with teams, interest groups, trade items, proposals, votes, and outcomes all connected to each other, so a relational database could handle those relationships directly instead of us recreating them throughout the app.</span></p><p><span>Building it wasn&#8217;t as clean as the plan made it sound. One particularly frustrating bug had students seeing final scores for both teams, but wildly skewed. After a lot of digging, the culprit turned out to be Supabase&#8217;s row-level security, not the scoring logic at all. Specific database policies were quietly blocking certain users from the rows with the correct point values. A good reminder that the most frustrating bugs aren&#8217;t always in the code you suspect. That bug, and plenty of others, reinforced our biggest lesson. You learn full-stack development fast once real people start using what you built. Beta testing surfaced problems that hours of solo testing never would have. Features that felt obvious to us confused first-time users, and workflows that worked fine with two test accounts broke the moment a whole class used them at once. We also learned a development plan can almost never be too detailed. It&#8217;s far easier to think through constraints up front than to reconstruct those decisions after something breaks, and a detailed plan makes it much easier to tell which features genuinely improve the simulation and which just add complexity.</span></p><p><span>In a way, building the app became an extension of the simulation itself. We wanted students to feel the real complications of bargaining, and building the software made us navigate our own version of the same tradeoffs. Simplicity versus flexibility, research versus teaching, what we wanted to build versus what we could realistically ship. What started as a paper-and-pencil classroom exercise is now a teaching tool, a research platform, and an ongoing coding project we keep developing alongside the instructors and students who use it.</span></p><p> </p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Effect of Tariff Information Lobbying on Product Stockpiling ]]></title><description><![CDATA[Analysis by Asher Smith.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/the-effect-of-tariff-information</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/the-effect-of-tariff-information</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2026 14:00:20 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dIK5!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99ab78f1-c5d4-4efa-a89e-1d5e35465adb_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dIK5!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99ab78f1-c5d4-4efa-a89e-1d5e35465adb_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dIK5!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99ab78f1-c5d4-4efa-a89e-1d5e35465adb_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dIK5!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99ab78f1-c5d4-4efa-a89e-1d5e35465adb_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dIK5!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99ab78f1-c5d4-4efa-a89e-1d5e35465adb_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dIK5!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99ab78f1-c5d4-4efa-a89e-1d5e35465adb_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dIK5!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99ab78f1-c5d4-4efa-a89e-1d5e35465adb_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/99ab78f1-c5d4-4efa-a89e-1d5e35465adb_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1858798,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/213716252?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99ab78f1-c5d4-4efa-a89e-1d5e35465adb_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dIK5!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99ab78f1-c5d4-4efa-a89e-1d5e35465adb_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dIK5!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99ab78f1-c5d4-4efa-a89e-1d5e35465adb_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dIK5!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99ab78f1-c5d4-4efa-a89e-1d5e35465adb_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dIK5!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99ab78f1-c5d4-4efa-a89e-1d5e35465adb_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>Picture a firm that finds out which of its imports are about to get hit with a new tariff, weeks before that tariff list becomes public. Is that just good instinct, or is the firm lobbying specifically to find out that information? Lobbying is usually framed as a tool for influencing policy outcomes, and most of what happens behind closed doors stays invisible to the public. Firms don&#8217;t only lobby to sway policy decisions. They also lobby to learn things, and if that means gaining access to nonpublic information, it can raise real ethical or even corruption concerns. During a trade war, that kind of early intelligence can be just as valuable as a tariff exemption, since it lets a firm adjust its supply chain before the rest of the market catches up.</span></p><p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.70083"><span>A recent paper</span></a><span> and policy by Bo Yang (University of Hong Kong) sets out to answer whether firms lobby specifically to gain early insight into pending trade policy and then use that insight to move faster than everyone else. Yang finds that lobbying firms increased their imports of products that would later be tariffed, before those tariffs were even announced. He argues this happened because lobbying gave these firms early insight into which products were likely to be targeted, letting them stockpile strategically instead of scrambling once tariffs took effect. That early advantage paid off twice. It let firms adjust their supply chains ahead of time, and it reduced how often they later needed to lobby again to request costly tariff exemptions. These effects have implications for the regulation of lobbying activities, and align with growing public demand for more clarity on corporate political influence</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p><span>Accordingly, Yang builds the analysis around the theory of information-seeking lobbying. The argument is that information gained through information-seeking lobbying gives firms a strategic market advantage. If that&#8217;s true, lobbying firms should stockpile selectively rather than broadly. They should be more likely to stockpile non-List 1 products that would soon be added to a tariff list, since they&#8217;d know those products were coming, and less likely to stockpile products that would remain untargeted or only be tariffed much later, since there&#8217;d be no reason to rush on those.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><div class="image-link image2" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qyk2!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9a8c4982-2f06-47dc-b961-42da8a350d87_624x227.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qyk2!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9a8c4982-2f06-47dc-b961-42da8a350d87_624x227.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qyk2!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9a8c4982-2f06-47dc-b961-42da8a350d87_624x227.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qyk2!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9a8c4982-2f06-47dc-b961-42da8a350d87_624x227.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qyk2!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9a8c4982-2f06-47dc-b961-42da8a350d87_624x227.png" width="624" height="227" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/9a8c4982-2f06-47dc-b961-42da8a350d87_624x227.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:227,&quot;width&quot;:624,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qyk2!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9a8c4982-2f06-47dc-b961-42da8a350d87_624x227.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qyk2!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9a8c4982-2f06-47dc-b961-42da8a350d87_624x227.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qyk2!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9a8c4982-2f06-47dc-b961-42da8a350d87_624x227.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qyk2!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9a8c4982-2f06-47dc-b961-42da8a350d87_624x227.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div></div></div></div></figure></div><p><span>Yang focuses on 2018 Q2, the window bookended by the United States Trade Representative&#8217;s announcement and rollout of three lists of tariffed Chinese products between April and September. To gather the data, he analyzed bills of lading records from the FactSet Shipping Transactions database, tracking Chinese imports for 717 US companies from January 2017 to September 2018. Cross-referencing this against all four USTR tariff lists showed which products were tariffed and when. Lobbying activity came from the LobbyView database, where firms&#8217; public disclosures made it possible to separate trade-related lobbying from everything else. That distinction turned out to be important. Trade-related lobbying jumped from 3.9% of all lobbying issues at the end of 2017 to 5.0% once the trade war began in Q3 2018, and lobbying specifically about China rose even more sharply within that, from 7.7% in Q4 2017 to 27.6% by Q3 2018. Yang also drew on voluntarily disclosed trade association memberships and data from the Center for Political Accountability to gauge how effective collective lobbying was compared to firms acting alone.</span></p><p><span>Yang&#8217;s firm-product-month data shows that in 2018 Q2, lobbying firms imported 93%-161% more non-List 1 products than firms that didn&#8217;t lobby. That gap disappeared the moment tariff lists were publicly announced, which rules out the possibility that lobbying and non-lobbying firms simply had different stockpiling habits to begin with. The pre-trade-war data backs this up too. There was no meaningful difference in import volume between the two groups before the war, and lobbying firms weren&#8217;t already importing more List 2 or List 3 products before March. This suggests that firms lobbying for policy information during that pre-announcement window had a real edge in deciding what to stockpile. That edge paid off again later: lobbying firms went on to file fewer tariff exclusion requests for the exact products they&#8217;d already stockpiled, sparing them a second round of costly engagement with the government. However, lobbying through trade organizations wasn&#8217;t nearly as effective at producing this stockpiling advantage as lobbying done by individual firms.</span></p><p><span>Beyond the legal and ethical questions this raises, and the public&#8217;s general distaste for backroom dealings between corporations and politicians, this pattern also threatens market competition. Larger firms invest more heavily in lobbying than smaller ones do, which hands them an information edge their smaller competitors simply don&#8217;t have. Yang&#8217;s proposed fix is to tighten lobbying disclosure rules, specifically requiring firms to report the actual purpose of their lobbying activities, not just that it happened.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Between Politics and Profit]]></title><description><![CDATA[An analysis by Kate Kelly.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/between-politics-and-profit</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/between-politics-and-profit</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 28 Aug 2026 15:59:36 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cLfU!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe540e513-7d7e-4dd7-9070-1313aac965ca_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cLfU!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe540e513-7d7e-4dd7-9070-1313aac965ca_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cLfU!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe540e513-7d7e-4dd7-9070-1313aac965ca_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cLfU!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe540e513-7d7e-4dd7-9070-1313aac965ca_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cLfU!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe540e513-7d7e-4dd7-9070-1313aac965ca_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cLfU!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe540e513-7d7e-4dd7-9070-1313aac965ca_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cLfU!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe540e513-7d7e-4dd7-9070-1313aac965ca_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/e540e513-7d7e-4dd7-9070-1313aac965ca_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:984398,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/212623094?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe540e513-7d7e-4dd7-9070-1313aac965ca_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cLfU!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe540e513-7d7e-4dd7-9070-1313aac965ca_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cLfU!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe540e513-7d7e-4dd7-9070-1313aac965ca_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cLfU!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe540e513-7d7e-4dd7-9070-1313aac965ca_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cLfU!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe540e513-7d7e-4dd7-9070-1313aac965ca_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>China is the United States&#8217; largest trading partner, and yet the two countries are in the midst of a trade war. As the Council on Foreign Relations states, &#8220;Economic tensions between Washington and Beijing have risen steadily over the past two decades as U.S. policymakers chart a progressively assertive course toward China.&#8221;</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a><span> This has become ever more prevalent today, with rising prices and pushes to diversify by the current administration.</span></p><p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-025-00800-3"><span>A recent article</span></a><span> by Bo Yang (University of Hong Kong), Jinyuan Song (George Mason University), Yifan Wei (Simon Fraser University), and Jing Li (Simon Fraser University) finds that even amid political pressure, both strategic and nonstrategic firms continued adding suppliers in China, with strategic firms adding new suppliers more slowly than nonstrategic firms. Importantly, political pressure still impacts firms, but they&#8217;re more inclined to stay if they gain significant revenue from China or rely heavily on Chinese suppliers. For these firms, walking away costs more than it&#8217;s worth, and that economic cost can outweigh the benefit of staying in the U.S. government&#8217;s good graces. The authors argue that the number of Chinese suppliers an American firm keeps is shaped both by its political leaning, with Republican-leaning firms derisking more, and by its concentration of supply networks and revenue derived from China. These patterns, they argue, are best explained by a legitimacy-efficiency tradeoff.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p><span>To investigate the issue, the researchers built their analysis around the legitimacy-efficiency tradeoff. Firms experience political pressure from home governments to derisk. If they don&#8217;t, they risk delegitimization, which can mean losing government contracts, financing, and research access. However, firms also have economic factors incentivizing them to stay in rival countries, from their revenue earned in that rival countries, to a high dependence on their rival country&#8217;s supply network. Ford&#8217;s decision to license Chinese technology for its U.S. electric vehicle battery plant demonstrates this tension. Ford&#8217;s move defied the push to diversify away from China, triggering months of congressional investigations and putting its eligibility for EV tax credits at risk. That&#8217;s the legitimacy-efficiency tradeoff at work: chasing one often means sacrificing the other, and Ford&#8217;s case shows just how costly that choice can be.</span></p><p><span>&#9;The research team conducted an observational study using data from the FactSet Revere Supply Chain Relationships database. Of the 513 firms in the sample, 138 firms in strategic industries served as the treatment group, and 245 comparable firms in non-strategic industries served as the control group. Using this data, they employed a DID Model, a method that compares how the treatment and control groups changed over time, to examine firms&#8217; adjustments due to political risks. The model has two independent variables, </span><em><span>Strategic Industries</span></em><span> and </span><em><span>Post-2017</span></em><span>. Together, these create an interaction term that captures the heightened geopolitical risk strategic firms faced after 2017. Moderating variables include </span><em><span>Share of Donations to Republicans</span></em><span>, </span><em><span>Share of Revenue from China</span></em><span>, and </span><em><span>Number of Sourcing Countries</span></em><span>. </span><em><span>Number of Chinese Suppliers</span></em><span> serves as the dependent variable.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gMUz!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d8ae31c-d17d-4c23-a05c-c418c2ec50b5_624x299.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gMUz!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d8ae31c-d17d-4c23-a05c-c418c2ec50b5_624x299.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gMUz!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d8ae31c-d17d-4c23-a05c-c418c2ec50b5_624x299.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gMUz!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d8ae31c-d17d-4c23-a05c-c418c2ec50b5_624x299.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gMUz!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d8ae31c-d17d-4c23-a05c-c418c2ec50b5_624x299.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gMUz!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d8ae31c-d17d-4c23-a05c-c418c2ec50b5_624x299.png" width="624" height="299" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/5d8ae31c-d17d-4c23-a05c-c418c2ec50b5_624x299.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:299,&quot;width&quot;:624,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gMUz!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d8ae31c-d17d-4c23-a05c-c418c2ec50b5_624x299.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gMUz!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d8ae31c-d17d-4c23-a05c-c418c2ec50b5_624x299.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gMUz!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d8ae31c-d17d-4c23-a05c-c418c2ec50b5_624x299.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gMUz!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d8ae31c-d17d-4c23-a05c-c418c2ec50b5_624x299.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>The authors&#8217; results supported their legitimacy-efficiency tradeoff argument. The gap in the number of Chinese suppliers between strategic and non-strategic sectors was more pronounced after 2017 than before it, suggesting that a firm&#8217;s status as strategic or non-strategic shapes its diversifying decisions. However, a firm&#8217;s sector isn&#8217;t the only factor that shapes its decision. Between 2017 and 2020, during the first Trump administration, Republican-leaning firms in strategic industries were more likely to derisk by removing supply chain reliance on China than similar Democratic-leaning firms, reflecting their differing opinions on China at the time. After Biden took office, firms in strategic industries of all political leanings were more likely to diversify, reflecting a converged view on China across parties.</span></p><p><span>Economic incentives also factor into a firm&#8217;s decision to derisk. Since firms tend to source from countries where they generate significant sales, higher revenue from China made firms less likely to cut Chinese suppliers, even in strategic industries. Along the same lines, the difference in Chinese suppliers before and after 2017 was less pronounced among firms with a less diversified supplier network.</span></p><p><span>The findings suggest that firms will continue to balance legitimacy and efficiency, ultimately choosing what is best for their economic success. As this study shows, that balance shifts with the political moment firms exist within. Firms lean toward legitimacy when the political cost of staying tied to China is high, and toward efficiency when the economic cost of leaving is higher still. However, the implications of this paper go far beyond the business realm. While the legitimacy-efficiency tradeoff described here is limited to firms, it could plausibly extend to consumers as well, showing up as higher costs, limited access to materials, and slower innovation. Geopolitical tensions, in other words, don&#8217;t stop at the boardroom; they eventually reach the consumers who rely on the firms caught in the middle.</span></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Will Multinational Corporations Shake at Political Tension? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[Analysis by Nikita Bates.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/will-multinational-corporations-shake</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/will-multinational-corporations-shake</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 16:01:53 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h_xb!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd2513699-4f48-4963-aadc-2163f956230c_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h_xb!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd2513699-4f48-4963-aadc-2163f956230c_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h_xb!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd2513699-4f48-4963-aadc-2163f956230c_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h_xb!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd2513699-4f48-4963-aadc-2163f956230c_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h_xb!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd2513699-4f48-4963-aadc-2163f956230c_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h_xb!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd2513699-4f48-4963-aadc-2163f956230c_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h_xb!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd2513699-4f48-4963-aadc-2163f956230c_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/d2513699-4f48-4963-aadc-2163f956230c_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:2594545,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/211739674?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd2513699-4f48-4963-aadc-2163f956230c_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h_xb!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd2513699-4f48-4963-aadc-2163f956230c_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h_xb!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd2513699-4f48-4963-aadc-2163f956230c_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h_xb!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd2513699-4f48-4963-aadc-2163f956230c_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h_xb!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd2513699-4f48-4963-aadc-2163f956230c_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>When political tension rises between nations, the effects are rarely contained within the government: they quickly reach the ears of multinational corporations (MNCs). Following President Chen Shui-bian&#8217;s 2002 &#8220;One Country on Each Side&#8221; (OCES) speech, tensions between China and Taiwan escalated quickly. Taiwan&#8217;s stock market dropped 5.77% in a single day,</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a><span> and Beijing warned the speech was &#8220;pushing Taiwan into war.&#8221;</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a><span> MNCs faced uncertainty over whether the tension would disrupt their supply chains. This article examines how MNCs respond to political tension, and why some firms adjust their trade strategies far more than others.</span></p><p><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1g87xTZn5YbSj5yVBF8MNsna6BhLkqg1I/view"><span>A recent paper by</span></a><span> Fanying Kong (University of International Business and Economics, China), Shengqiao Lin (University of Toronto), and Xuan Wang (Peking University) examines how MNCs adjust trade strategies during political tension. The authors argue that political tension alone, even without any actual military conflict, creates enough uncertainty to push firms into &#8216;de-risking&#8217;: cutting back on suppliers from the tense region so they&#8217;re not caught off guard if trade gets disrupted.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p><span>To explain why multinational corporations respond differently to political tensions, researchers began with a straightforward theory. Firms adjust their strategies according to the risk they face, and as geopolitical tension rises, companies worry about supply chain disruptions and may reduce trade with risky regions. However, the researchers argue that not every firm assesses that risk the same way, depending on two mechanisms.</span></p><p><span>The first is supply chain connectedness. Firms that rely heavily on suppliers from a politically risky region, have geographically concentrated supply chains, or use imported goods for further processing face more exposure because they&#8217;ve invested more heavily in those relationships. For instance, two firms might each get 70% of their imports from Taiwan, but if one sources the remaining 30% from five different countries while the other relies on a single supplier, the latter has far fewer alternatives if trade is disrupted. Firms that use imports in processing also have higher sunk costs, since their production lines are built around specific suppliers, making adjustment expensive.</span></p><p><span>The second is home connections. Firms with investment origins in the risky region tend to have stronger relationships, more trust, and better information on local conditions, all of which reduce uncertainty. That makes Taiwan-invested firms less likely to change their trading behavior even as tensions rise.</span></p><p><span>From this, the researchers proposed three hypotheses. MNCs reduce imports from a host country&#8217;s adversarial regions during political tension (H1). That reduction is larger for firms more reliant on suppliers in those regions, more concentrated in their sourcing, or trading final goods rather than processed ones (H2). And MNCs invested in the adversarial region itself are less likely to cut imports, since those ties act as a buffer (H3).</span></p><p><span>To test these, the researchers analyzed over 1.4 million import transactions from 20,854 foreign-invested firms in mainland China between 2001 and 2003, drawn from multiple government databases and tracking import values, supplier locations, investment origins, and whether goods were used for processing. Using synthetic control and difference-in-differences methods, they compared Taiwan imports before and after the OCES speech against imports from other countries. Taiwan was an ideal test case. As Table 1 shows, it was China&#8217;s second-largest import partner at the time, at 15.16% of total imports, right behind Japan.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bk2W!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe6fafb33-8d0d-49a4-8329-c0180e5e92d8_602x403.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bk2W!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe6fafb33-8d0d-49a4-8329-c0180e5e92d8_602x403.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bk2W!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe6fafb33-8d0d-49a4-8329-c0180e5e92d8_602x403.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bk2W!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe6fafb33-8d0d-49a4-8329-c0180e5e92d8_602x403.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bk2W!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe6fafb33-8d0d-49a4-8329-c0180e5e92d8_602x403.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bk2W!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe6fafb33-8d0d-49a4-8329-c0180e5e92d8_602x403.png" width="602" height="403" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/e6fafb33-8d0d-49a4-8329-c0180e5e92d8_602x403.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:403,&quot;width&quot;:602,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bk2W!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe6fafb33-8d0d-49a4-8329-c0180e5e92d8_602x403.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bk2W!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe6fafb33-8d0d-49a4-8329-c0180e5e92d8_602x403.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bk2W!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe6fafb33-8d0d-49a4-8329-c0180e5e92d8_602x403.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bk2W!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe6fafb33-8d0d-49a4-8329-c0180e5e92d8_602x403.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!khKx!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7055b77d-b74d-41cf-b213-7e7dba2b34c3_602x400.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!khKx!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7055b77d-b74d-41cf-b213-7e7dba2b34c3_602x400.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!khKx!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7055b77d-b74d-41cf-b213-7e7dba2b34c3_602x400.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!khKx!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7055b77d-b74d-41cf-b213-7e7dba2b34c3_602x400.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!khKx!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7055b77d-b74d-41cf-b213-7e7dba2b34c3_602x400.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!khKx!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7055b77d-b74d-41cf-b213-7e7dba2b34c3_602x400.png" width="602" height="400" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/7055b77d-b74d-41cf-b213-7e7dba2b34c3_602x400.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:400,&quot;width&quot;:602,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!khKx!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7055b77d-b74d-41cf-b213-7e7dba2b34c3_602x400.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!khKx!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7055b77d-b74d-41cf-b213-7e7dba2b34c3_602x400.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!khKx!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7055b77d-b74d-41cf-b213-7e7dba2b34c3_602x400.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!khKx!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7055b77d-b74d-41cf-b213-7e7dba2b34c3_602x400.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>Running these models against the data, the researchers found strong support for their hypotheses. After the OCES speech, MNCs cut imports from Taiwan by roughly 8% relative to the expected trend (Figure 2), and firm-level estimates landed in a similar 7.13%-9.62% range across models. Firms heavily reliant on Taiwanese suppliers saw larger declines, while processing-trade firms cut imports about 9.8% less than firms buying finished goods, confirming the sunk-cost logic behind embeddedness. And home connections mattered: non-Taiwan-invested firms cut imports by about 8.9%, while the effect on Taiwan-invested firms was statistically insignificant, meaning those relationships genuinely buffered firms from the shock.</span></p><p><span>In a moment of rising geopolitical competition, this study shows MNCs make decisions based on political risk as much as profit. Firms adjust supply chains depending on their exposure to uncertainty and their embeddedness in risky regions, while home connections let some firms ride out tension that hits others harder. That means political conflict can reshape trade long before sanctions or military action ever occur, and it makes firms worth studying as political actors in their own right, not just economic ones.</span></p><p><span>This pattern keeps appearing. For example, after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi&#8217;s 2022 visit to Taiwan, Taiwan&#8217;s exports to China fell 4%, then another 21% in 2023</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a><span>, while many Chinese firms opened operations in Mexico to hedge against exactly this kind of risk.</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> <span>As global supply chains grow more entangled with geopolitics, the harder question is what this de-risking looks like over the long run. Are firms permanently restructuring where they source from, or just pausing until tensions cool? The researchers note their data captures trade volumes but not the full architecture of firms&#8217; supply networks, leaving that question for future work.</span></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Sina Finance, "Chen Shuibian's 'One Country on Each Side' Hit Taiwan Financial Market, Taiwan Stock Drop by 500 billion," August 6, 2002.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Xinhua News Agency, "Dangerous Provocation&#8212;Commentary on Chen Shui-bian's Divisive Remarks," August 6, 2002.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Statista, "Value of goods exports from Taiwan to mainland China between 2013 and 2023," March 1, 2024.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>The Economist, "Why Chinese companies are flocking to Mexico," November 23, 2023.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[To Leave or Not to Leave? Inside the Mind of a Corporation]]></title><description><![CDATA[Analysis by Noah Muchiri.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/to-leave-or-not-to-leave-inside-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/to-leave-or-not-to-leave-inside-the</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 14 Aug 2026 16:00:08 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kdHa!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b557064-213c-46fb-b501-e4d3ccb12d96_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kdHa!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b557064-213c-46fb-b501-e4d3ccb12d96_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kdHa!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b557064-213c-46fb-b501-e4d3ccb12d96_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kdHa!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b557064-213c-46fb-b501-e4d3ccb12d96_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kdHa!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b557064-213c-46fb-b501-e4d3ccb12d96_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kdHa!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b557064-213c-46fb-b501-e4d3ccb12d96_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kdHa!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b557064-213c-46fb-b501-e4d3ccb12d96_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/1b557064-213c-46fb-b501-e4d3ccb12d96_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1829784,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/210638731?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b557064-213c-46fb-b501-e4d3ccb12d96_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kdHa!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b557064-213c-46fb-b501-e4d3ccb12d96_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kdHa!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b557064-213c-46fb-b501-e4d3ccb12d96_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kdHa!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b557064-213c-46fb-b501-e4d3ccb12d96_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kdHa!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b557064-213c-46fb-b501-e4d3ccb12d96_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>Do corporations care about the reputations of countries they conduct business with? When Russia invaded Ukraine, Russia faced widespread condemnation from citizens and the media, followed by economic sanctions from numerous foreign governments. Despite the economic and social pressure, some foreign-invested firms (businesses with at least 10% foreign ownership) remained in Russia, including PepsiCo and Nestle. Why did some firms stay and others leave? Furthermore, are nations able to weaponize and use their multinational corporations as tools to economically pressure other countries?</span></p><p><span>These inquiries are addressed in the recent paper, </span><em><a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305542610152X"><span>Exiting Russia</span></a></em><span>, by Rachel Wellhausen (University of Texas at Austin) and Boliang Zhu (Pennsylvania State University). Examining the variables influencing a firm&#8217;s decision to stay or leave, they found that foreign-invested firms in consumer-oriented industries and those under Russian managerial control faced more pressure to exit, while firms in industries critical to Russia&#8217;s economy were less likely to leave. To explain this, they argue that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) exit should be seen as a transaction: firms weigh what&#8217;s at stake (reputation, customers, punishment) if they don&#8217;t sell against what they give up if they do (selling at a loss, sunk costs, a foreign market).</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p><span>FDI matters because in an integrated global economy, capital doesn&#8217;t just vanish quietly, its sudden removal can disrupt whole economies. While there&#8217;s a wealth of literature on why firms enter foreign markets, almost none exists on why they leave, and what little does treats exit as expropriation: the host state seizing or forcing a sale. Wellhausen and Zhu argue that framework doesn&#8217;t fit Russia. Rather than expropriating firms outright, Russia mostly let capital leave through voluntary sales, shaped by pressures like consumer opinion, home-state politics, and worsening economic conditions, and by firm traits like hard-to-move assets, industry importance to Russia, and how much domestic managers already controlled.</span></p><p><span>As seen in Table 2, the authors split their variables into two buckets: pressures to sell and terms of the sale. They expected firms to be more likely to exit if they were from &#8220;unfriendly&#8221; states (H1a), named on public praise-and-shame lists (H1b), in consumer-oriented industries (H1c), or majority-owned by Russian shareholders (H2a), and less likely to exit if they were in industries critical to Russia&#8217;s economy (H2b) or industries with more fixed assets (H2c). To test this, Wellhausen and Zhu built a list of 42,720 foreign-invested firms active just before the invasion, then checked 18 months later whether their foreign investors still held meaningful control. Each hypothesis got its own measure: Russia&#8217;s own &#8220;unfriendly&#8221; list for H1a; matches against name-and-shame lists for H1b (16.3% of firms); U.S. advertising spending as a stand-in for consumer orientation for H1c; majority Russian ownership as a proxy for managerial control for H2a; a 2008 Russian &#8220;systemically important&#8221; firms list to flag strategic industries for H2b; and U.S. industry data on fixed-asset intensity for H2c. They also controlled for factors like whether a firm&#8217;s home state was Cyprus, had an investment treaty with Russia, or was state-owned.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_d33!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe8d98c0-d5c4-4380-a9dc-9a441e2d7808_441x303.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_d33!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe8d98c0-d5c4-4380-a9dc-9a441e2d7808_441x303.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_d33!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe8d98c0-d5c4-4380-a9dc-9a441e2d7808_441x303.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_d33!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe8d98c0-d5c4-4380-a9dc-9a441e2d7808_441x303.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_d33!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe8d98c0-d5c4-4380-a9dc-9a441e2d7808_441x303.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_d33!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe8d98c0-d5c4-4380-a9dc-9a441e2d7808_441x303.png" width="441" height="303" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/be8d98c0-d5c4-4380-a9dc-9a441e2d7808_441x303.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:303,&quot;width&quot;:441,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_d33!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe8d98c0-d5c4-4380-a9dc-9a441e2d7808_441x303.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_d33!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe8d98c0-d5c4-4380-a9dc-9a441e2d7808_441x303.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_d33!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe8d98c0-d5c4-4380-a9dc-9a441e2d7808_441x303.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_d33!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe8d98c0-d5c4-4380-a9dc-9a441e2d7808_441x303.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>Wellhausen and Zhu&#8217;s hypotheses produced mixed results, but almost every variable had a significant effect on firm behavior, whether or not it matched their prediction. Over the 18-month period, the exit rate for the 42,000 firms studied hit 33.3%, up from a pre-invasion rate of 25.3%, though most of that exodus wasn&#8217;t firms shutting down: just 5.4% went inactive, while 27.9% stayed active under new ownership. To make sure this spike was actually tied to the invasion and not some other trend, the authors ran a placebo test against Russia&#8217;s 2014 annexation of Crimea. H1a (unfriendly home state) and H1b (name-and-shame) were both proven wrong, with firms actually 0.5-3.3% and 4.7-5.6% less likely to exit, respectively. H1c (consumer-oriented industry) and H2a (Russian managerial control) held up, with firms 3.8-4.8% and 5.9-6.2% more likely to exit, respectively. H2b (Russian strategic industry) held up too, but in the other direction: firms in strategic industries were 4.1-4.3% less likely to exit, exactly as predicted. H2c (high fixed assets) had essentially no effect, raising real questions about how much weight asset mobility actually carries in firms&#8217; decision-making.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Ialv!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9016baf6-0b0d-4b61-ba37-f3b0e1033952_378x441.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Ialv!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9016baf6-0b0d-4b61-ba37-f3b0e1033952_378x441.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Ialv!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9016baf6-0b0d-4b61-ba37-f3b0e1033952_378x441.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Ialv!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9016baf6-0b0d-4b61-ba37-f3b0e1033952_378x441.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Ialv!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9016baf6-0b0d-4b61-ba37-f3b0e1033952_378x441.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Ialv!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9016baf6-0b0d-4b61-ba37-f3b0e1033952_378x441.png" width="378" height="441" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/9016baf6-0b0d-4b61-ba37-f3b0e1033952_378x441.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:441,&quot;width&quot;:378,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Ialv!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9016baf6-0b0d-4b61-ba37-f3b0e1033952_378x441.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Ialv!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9016baf6-0b0d-4b61-ba37-f3b0e1033952_378x441.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Ialv!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9016baf6-0b0d-4b61-ba37-f3b0e1033952_378x441.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Ialv!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9016baf6-0b0d-4b61-ba37-f3b0e1033952_378x441.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>Wellhausen and Zhu&#8217;s article pushes back on the FDI literature to argue that exit should be viewed differently: as a transaction weighing a seller&#8217;s pros and cons against how much a firm&#8217;s departure would cost the host state, and thus how hard that state will fight to keep it. Their mixed results suggest that while nations can try to prevent firms from leaving through means short of expropriation, like making exit costly for firms critical to their economy, they ultimately cannot reliably weaponize their firms against other countries the way they might wish. A firm&#8217;s home nation pressuring it to leave simply isn&#8217;t the most important factor in that firm&#8217;s decision. But if home states keep pushing firms to become more footloose and quicker to exit, will that undermine other host states&#8217; confidence in FDI as a reliable development tool? That question needs more work to answer, but for now, Wellhausen and Zhu contend that &#8220;FDI is at best an imperfect tool of economic statecraft.&#8221;</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[How the U.S. secures broad compliance with little action]]></title><description><![CDATA[An analysis by Elizabeth Olson.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/how-the-us-secures-broad-compliance</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/how-the-us-secures-broad-compliance</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 07 Aug 2026 16:00:23 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!b_mX!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb743bbb1-d80d-4ea8-964c-f2d6a53039f4_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!b_mX!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb743bbb1-d80d-4ea8-964c-f2d6a53039f4_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!b_mX!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb743bbb1-d80d-4ea8-964c-f2d6a53039f4_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!b_mX!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb743bbb1-d80d-4ea8-964c-f2d6a53039f4_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!b_mX!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb743bbb1-d80d-4ea8-964c-f2d6a53039f4_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!b_mX!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb743bbb1-d80d-4ea8-964c-f2d6a53039f4_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!b_mX!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb743bbb1-d80d-4ea8-964c-f2d6a53039f4_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/b743bbb1-d80d-4ea8-964c-f2d6a53039f4_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:2217950,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/209826585?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb743bbb1-d80d-4ea8-964c-f2d6a53039f4_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!b_mX!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb743bbb1-d80d-4ea8-964c-f2d6a53039f4_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!b_mX!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb743bbb1-d80d-4ea8-964c-f2d6a53039f4_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!b_mX!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb743bbb1-d80d-4ea8-964c-f2d6a53039f4_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!b_mX!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb743bbb1-d80d-4ea8-964c-f2d6a53039f4_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>When countries clash today, they increasingly reach for economic sanctions rather than weapons. One of the biggest users of this strategy is the United States, which imposes more sanctions than any other country. Although this is true, the U.S. Department of the Treasury&#8217;s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the federal agency that administers and enforces U.S. economic sanctions, has limited resources and needs to enforce sanctions in the most effective and cost-efficient way possible. Based on the evidence gathered, it&#8217;s argued that this enforcement approach targets high-profile firms, visible &#8216;whales&#8217; generates more deterrence per enforcement action than pursuing many smaller violators.</span></p><p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2023.22"><span>A recent paper</span></a><span> by Keith A. Preble (Miami University, Oxford) and Bryan R. Early (University at Albany, SUNY) finds evidence that shows the OFAC enforces sanctions by focusing its efforts on giving larger penalties for high-profile compared to low-profile firms. Specifically, large penalties occur with foreign high-profile firms. They theorize that this is due to high-profile firms having large reputations that, with this naming-and-shaming policy, would prompt mass media coverage and lasting reputational damage to the companies being targeted. The authors argue that the media attention generated by these actions is meant to create a ripple effect, with other, smaller companies adhering to the sanctions to avoid the same fate reported on. These findings, gathered by the researchers, show how the U.S. has been enforcing company sanctions with the limited resources of the OFAC.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p><span>To investigate their question the researchers first theorize that the U.S. is more likely to inflict larger penalties on high-profile firms, rather than low-profile ones. Secondly, they theorize a &#8216;name and shame&#8217; effect, where publicizing a fine against a well-known firm materially harms its reputation, translating into lost investor confidence and weakened business relationships. This is believed to be the strategy of the OFAC due to the cognitive heuristics of availability bias and probability neglect. Due to availability bias, if high-profile firms are to be reported more often than low-profile firms, it means smaller companies are more likely to remember or hear about these instances, which may create fear among them. The probability that they, as low-profile firms, will be fined is low compared to high-profile firms; however, due to probability neglect, though, the companies still fear penalties against them and change their actions in order to avoid the possibility.</span></p><p><span>To test these two theories, the researchers gathered data on 207 firms, both foreign and domestic, and separated them by the level of profile of each firm. The researchers then went on to calculate, on average, how much the firms were fined, shown in Table 2a and Table 2b. To test their second theory on media traction on high-profile companies, the researchers used LexisNexis to gather the number of news reports made on a high-profile firm, Berkshire Hathaway, that was fined $4.14 million, and compared it to a low-profile firm, Generali Global Assistance, that was fined $5.86 million (Figure 3).</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IhsT!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2104ad6c-c573-4e11-9641-f45381ece0f9_500x464.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IhsT!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2104ad6c-c573-4e11-9641-f45381ece0f9_500x464.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IhsT!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2104ad6c-c573-4e11-9641-f45381ece0f9_500x464.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IhsT!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2104ad6c-c573-4e11-9641-f45381ece0f9_500x464.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IhsT!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2104ad6c-c573-4e11-9641-f45381ece0f9_500x464.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IhsT!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2104ad6c-c573-4e11-9641-f45381ece0f9_500x464.png" width="500" height="464" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/2104ad6c-c573-4e11-9641-f45381ece0f9_500x464.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:464,&quot;width&quot;:500,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IhsT!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2104ad6c-c573-4e11-9641-f45381ece0f9_500x464.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IhsT!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2104ad6c-c573-4e11-9641-f45381ece0f9_500x464.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IhsT!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2104ad6c-c573-4e11-9641-f45381ece0f9_500x464.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IhsT!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2104ad6c-c573-4e11-9641-f45381ece0f9_500x464.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F3jO!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbfbbace9-b927-4e1f-88c4-fffa5568ce76_533x328.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F3jO!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbfbbace9-b927-4e1f-88c4-fffa5568ce76_533x328.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F3jO!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbfbbace9-b927-4e1f-88c4-fffa5568ce76_533x328.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F3jO!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbfbbace9-b927-4e1f-88c4-fffa5568ce76_533x328.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F3jO!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbfbbace9-b927-4e1f-88c4-fffa5568ce76_533x328.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F3jO!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbfbbace9-b927-4e1f-88c4-fffa5568ce76_533x328.png" width="533" height="328" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/bfbbace9-b927-4e1f-88c4-fffa5568ce76_533x328.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:328,&quot;width&quot;:533,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F3jO!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbfbbace9-b927-4e1f-88c4-fffa5568ce76_533x328.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F3jO!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbfbbace9-b927-4e1f-88c4-fffa5568ce76_533x328.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F3jO!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbfbbace9-b927-4e1f-88c4-fffa5568ce76_533x328.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F3jO!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbfbbace9-b927-4e1f-88c4-fffa5568ce76_533x328.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>In Table 2a and Table 2b, the data show a large difference in the costs of repercussions faced by low-profile firms and high-profile firms. High-profile domestic firms were fined about 6 times more than their low-profile counterparts, and high-profile foreign firms were fined about 18 times more. This table shows that not only are high-profile firms fined a greater cost than low-profile firms, but it also shows that foreign firms are fined more than domestic, due to foreign firms requiring higher penalties in order to gain media attention in the U.S. In order to explain why high-profile firms are fined more than low-profile ones, the researchers used the gathered data from LexisNexis, seen in Figure 3. Figure 3, which compares the number of news reports made over a high-profile firm, Berkshire, being fined in comparison to a low-profile firm, Generali, shows that Berkshire had 113 more reports made than Generali&#8217;s 7 reports, despite the fact that Berkshire was fined about $1.7 million less than Generali.</span></p><p><span>This data shows the tactics used by OFAC to enforce government sanctions on companies. Due to the limited resources granted to the OFAC, achieving maximum compliance with minimal action is important, as seen in who they target. High-profile firms are being fined at a significantly larger amount than low-profile firms, in order to foster as much media attention as possible. This action is intended to damage the company&#8217;s large reputation, with lasting effects. At the same time, the authors argue that the media coverage gained from these actions is meant to push lower-profile firms to change their ways in order to adhere to sanctions, due to the fear of being met with the same repercussions. Although evidence shows the theories created seem to be true, the actual after-effect isn&#8217;t reported in the paper. Whether or not smaller firms change their actions due to high-profile firms being targeted has yet to be proven. Instead, the behavioral response is inferred from the heuristics of availability bias and probability neglect. So while Preble and Early show that OFAC does target high-profile firms with larger fines, the paper doesn&#8217;t directly test whether that strategy actually changes how other companies behave, which is a link future research would need to confirm.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Why U.S. Firms Oppose Sanctions on Russia]]></title><description><![CDATA[An analysis by Serena Karou.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/why-us-firms-oppose-sanctions-on</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/why-us-firms-oppose-sanctions-on</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 31 Jul 2026 16:00:19 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p8o8!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faead0bcb-f6de-4681-9ae0-6961d4dffae8_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p8o8!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faead0bcb-f6de-4681-9ae0-6961d4dffae8_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p8o8!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faead0bcb-f6de-4681-9ae0-6961d4dffae8_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p8o8!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faead0bcb-f6de-4681-9ae0-6961d4dffae8_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p8o8!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faead0bcb-f6de-4681-9ae0-6961d4dffae8_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p8o8!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faead0bcb-f6de-4681-9ae0-6961d4dffae8_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p8o8!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faead0bcb-f6de-4681-9ae0-6961d4dffae8_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/aead0bcb-f6de-4681-9ae0-6961d4dffae8_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1031756,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/208898426?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faead0bcb-f6de-4681-9ae0-6961d4dffae8_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p8o8!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faead0bcb-f6de-4681-9ae0-6961d4dffae8_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p8o8!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faead0bcb-f6de-4681-9ae0-6961d4dffae8_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p8o8!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faead0bcb-f6de-4681-9ae0-6961d4dffae8_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p8o8!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faead0bcb-f6de-4681-9ae0-6961d4dffae8_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>Economic sanctions are a frequently used alternative to military force, a way for governments to pressure foreign countries by imposing economic costs rather than deploying troops. They are meant to make the targeted country pay a high enough price that it changes its behavior, but they rarely affect only the target. They can also disrupt businesses in the sanctioning country that depend on trade relationships with the sanctioned country. Scholars have long been deliberating whether sanctions actually work, but far less attention has been paid to how these firms respond when their own government&#8217;s policies threaten their operations. Do companies back sanctions for the national interest, or do they push back when their profits are at stake? This article looks at US firms that lobbied Congress over sanctions on Russia, and finds that the firms most deeply embedded in Russian supply chains were the ones most likely to lobby against the sanctions.</span></p><p><span>According to a </span><a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqag010"><span>recent paper</span></a><span> by Lingbo Zhao (Pennsylvania State University), corporations&#8217; decisions to lobby against economic sanctions are driven far less by loyalty to U.S. foreign policy than by their own economic ties to Russia. In particular, firms whose exports relied on Russian inputs were especially likely to oppose sanctions. When sanctions threaten to disrupt supply chains, foreign investments, or imports, corporations are far more likely to lobby against the legislation before it even passes. This finding challenges the assumption that domestic corporations will support their government&#8217;s foreign policy regardless of cost, highlighting instead the tradeoffs firms weigh between national interest and economic burden, and raises questions about the extent to which private economic interests influence the success of sanctions.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p><span>To figure out why corporations opposed sanctions, Zhao built an original dataset of U.S. firms that lobbied on bills proposing economic sanctions against Russia between 2014 and 2022, a period that included three major waves of sanctions tied to Crimea, election interference, and Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><div class="image-link image2" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZ7P!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F723150bf-3772-4a80-bed4-153529f0c60f_405x230.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZ7P!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F723150bf-3772-4a80-bed4-153529f0c60f_405x230.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZ7P!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F723150bf-3772-4a80-bed4-153529f0c60f_405x230.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZ7P!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F723150bf-3772-4a80-bed4-153529f0c60f_405x230.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZ7P!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F723150bf-3772-4a80-bed4-153529f0c60f_405x230.png" width="405" height="230" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/723150bf-3772-4a80-bed4-153529f0c60f_405x230.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:230,&quot;width&quot;:405,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZ7P!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F723150bf-3772-4a80-bed4-153529f0c60f_405x230.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZ7P!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F723150bf-3772-4a80-bed4-153529f0c60f_405x230.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZ7P!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F723150bf-3772-4a80-bed4-153529f0c60f_405x230.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZ7P!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F723150bf-3772-4a80-bed4-153529f0c60f_405x230.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div></div></div></div><figcaption class="image-caption"><em>Figure 1. Number of lobbying records on Russia sanctions by year.</em></figcaption></figure></div><p><span>By comparing federal lobbying records with a sample of about 48,000 large U.S. firms, Zhao examined three specific ways a company might have financial ties to Russia: how dependent its industry was on Russian supply chains, whether it had subsidiaries operating in Russia, and whether it purchased goods directly from Russian companies. To avoid using data already affected by earlier sanctions, Zhao used 2013 as a baseline and then conducted additional analyses to estimate the likelihood that a firm would lobby at least once during the period studied.</span></p><p><span>All three of Zhao&#8217;s hypotheses were supported by her findings. Companies in industries that depended on Russian materials or goods to continue operation showed significantly higher rates of lobbying. At the individual company level, having a Russian subsidiary or importing from Russia were both predictors of lobbying activity, with direct imports having a particularly large effect. To ensure the findings were not merely showing that large companies tend to lobby on everything, Zhao conducted a placebo test. The same Russia-related business practices did not predict lobbying on domestic issues such as taxes or labor policy. Ultimately, the results showed that firms responded to specific threats that depended on their operations.</span></p><p><span>Governments often think of sanctions as a straightforward tool of foreign policy to pressure foreign governments, but Zhao's research demonstrates that they can produce unintended consequences for businesses in the countries that impose them. U.S. firms with substantial investments, trade, or supply chain connections to sanctioned states are more likely to lobby against sanctions that threaten their own operations. Although Zhao does not determine whether this lobbying actually weakened sanctions, her findings suggest that firms could have an influence on how effective sanctions ultimately are. The study provides an excellent illustration for how the globalization of production complicates governments' ability to pursue foreign policy objectives without imposing costs on their own economies.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[When the Plant Closes: How Economic Shocks Turn Industrial Hubs Right ]]></title><description><![CDATA[An analysis by Lena Hasiuk.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/when-the-plant-closes-how-economic</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/when-the-plant-closes-how-economic</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 16:00:24 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_5qm!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F12152b65-e2aa-432c-adac-c98f99781349_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_5qm!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F12152b65-e2aa-432c-adac-c98f99781349_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_5qm!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F12152b65-e2aa-432c-adac-c98f99781349_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_5qm!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F12152b65-e2aa-432c-adac-c98f99781349_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_5qm!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F12152b65-e2aa-432c-adac-c98f99781349_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_5qm!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F12152b65-e2aa-432c-adac-c98f99781349_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_5qm!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F12152b65-e2aa-432c-adac-c98f99781349_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/12152b65-e2aa-432c-adac-c98f99781349_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1428654,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/178826041?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F12152b65-e2aa-432c-adac-c98f99781349_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_5qm!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F12152b65-e2aa-432c-adac-c98f99781349_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_5qm!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F12152b65-e2aa-432c-adac-c98f99781349_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_5qm!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F12152b65-e2aa-432c-adac-c98f99781349_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_5qm!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F12152b65-e2aa-432c-adac-c98f99781349_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>Industrial hubs have long been understood as sites of economic strength and growth in the United States, but over the last 20 years, these areas have absorbed a disproportionate share of the country&#8217;s job losses. Conventional wisdom among scholars holds that economic pain pushes voters left, toward candidates who promise to address those losses. Yet when analyzing voter behavior from the 2000 election of George W. Bush to the 2016 election of Donald Trump, experts observed the opposite: the regions hit hardest shifted sharply to the right. There is ample evidence that Trump tapped into working-class resentment amid globalization, but existing research can&#8217;t explain why a similar shock would push one region right and another left.</span></p><p><span>A </span><a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818325101203"><span>recent paper</span></a><span> by Sung Eun Kim (Korea University) and Krzysztof Pelc (Oxford University) offer an answer. An industrial hub is a region heavily specialized in one industry relative to the rest of the country, such as Detroit in the automobile industry. The political fallout of a shock, they argue, depends on whether the lost jobs were in one of these concentrated hubs or in a more diffuse industry not tied to any single place. The same shock pushes a hub region to the right and a diffuse-industry region to the left. The difference is identity: in a hub, social and professional networks overlap so completely that the community&#8217;s sense of itself is bound up in the local industry, so its decline registers not as a lost paycheck but as a threat to who the region is. Right-wing populists, who speak to nostalgia and lost standing, are best positioned to capture that grievance.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p><span>Take Clyde, Ohio, where families have worked at the Whirlpool plant for five generations, and most residents have childhood friends on the line. When the jobs go, the loss strains the whole community, its churches, schools, and sports teams, and strips the town of the industry that defined it. Where pain is scattered across many industries, the left&#8217;s redistributive message can address it; in a concentrated hub, it is the right that turns nostalgia and cultural loss into votes.</span></p><p><span>To test this, the authors identify hubs using commuting zones (counties linked by where people live and work) and cluster mapping, which sorts industries into related groups like automotive and textiles. A region counts as a hub for an industry only when that industry is both unusually concentrated there, and the region&#8217;s most distinctive. They measure economic pain with Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) petitions from 2000 to 2015; the claims workers file for relief after losing jobs to trade. Because each petition names an industry and a location, the authors split the shock into the part that hits a region&#8217;s hubs and the part that hits its non-hubs, which lets them compare equal-sized shocks across the two. They pair this with three original surveys of more than 7,300 Americans, probing peer networks, perceptions of regional standing, and appetite for populist leaders, and, following Autor and colleagues, with the change in each county&#8217;s Republican vote share between 2000 and 2016.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QPma!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faa434c97-1b90-4d80-9dec-89d4ace42f07_936x1360.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QPma!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faa434c97-1b90-4d80-9dec-89d4ace42f07_936x1360.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QPma!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faa434c97-1b90-4d80-9dec-89d4ace42f07_936x1360.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QPma!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faa434c97-1b90-4d80-9dec-89d4ace42f07_936x1360.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QPma!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faa434c97-1b90-4d80-9dec-89d4ace42f07_936x1360.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QPma!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faa434c97-1b90-4d80-9dec-89d4ace42f07_936x1360.png" width="936" height="1360" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/aa434c97-1b90-4d80-9dec-89d4ace42f07_936x1360.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1360,&quot;width&quot;:936,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QPma!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faa434c97-1b90-4d80-9dec-89d4ace42f07_936x1360.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QPma!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faa434c97-1b90-4d80-9dec-89d4ace42f07_936x1360.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QPma!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faa434c97-1b90-4d80-9dec-89d4ace42f07_936x1360.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QPma!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faa434c97-1b90-4d80-9dec-89d4ace42f07_936x1360.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>The results line up. Residents of hub regions are far more likely to hold politicians responsible for downturns: on a 0-to-10 scale, 10 more TAA petitions per 1,000 workers in a hub industry raise that belief by 0.12 to 0.13 points, compared with just 0.02 in non-hubs. Peer ties drive this: a one-standard-deviation increase in the number of high-school classmates working in your industry lifts that same score by about 0.55 points, an effect roughly as large as belonging to a union. The same shock erodes people&#8217;s sense of their region&#8217;s standing more sharply in hubs, a 0.1-point drop versus 0.04, an effect that holds even after accounting for how people rate their own personal status, so the loss is regional, not just personal. And those who feel their region has fallen behind are markedly more drawn to populist leaders, while personal status shows no such pull.</span></p><p><span>At the ballot box, the pattern completes itself: in a concentrated hub industry, ten more laid-off workers per 1,000 is associated with a 0.38 to 0.49 percentage-point increase in support for Trump in 2016, while the same shock to a diffuse industry pushes voters toward the Democrats.</span></p><p><span>The throughline is clear: an economic shock&#8217;s political fallout depends on whether it hits an industry on which a region is built. In a tightly connected hub, the loss isn&#8217;t just to wallets but to the institutions and identity that hold a community together. That is why checks alone fall short. Person-based relief like Social Security and Medicaid steadies individual incomes, but it can&#8217;t restore what a community loses when the industry that defined it disappears. Repairing that kind of damage takes place-based support: investment in local industry and infrastructure, not just mailed checks. Economic hubs always have the potential to make an outsized impact on the people who live within them. Whether that impact is job growth spurred by investment or a surge in populist sentiment depends on where the shock lands.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Made in China, Blamed in America?]]></title><description><![CDATA[Blaming China has become one of the few things Democrats and Republicans agree on.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/made-in-china-blamed-in-america</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/made-in-china-blamed-in-america</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Charlie Andrade]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 16:05:17 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9s-l!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b0c34e-1f7c-4a6c-b3ee-179e28be26ae_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9s-l!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b0c34e-1f7c-4a6c-b3ee-179e28be26ae_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9s-l!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b0c34e-1f7c-4a6c-b3ee-179e28be26ae_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9s-l!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b0c34e-1f7c-4a6c-b3ee-179e28be26ae_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9s-l!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b0c34e-1f7c-4a6c-b3ee-179e28be26ae_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9s-l!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b0c34e-1f7c-4a6c-b3ee-179e28be26ae_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9s-l!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b0c34e-1f7c-4a6c-b3ee-179e28be26ae_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/66b0c34e-1f7c-4a6c-b3ee-179e28be26ae_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1767368,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/183960503?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b0c34e-1f7c-4a6c-b3ee-179e28be26ae_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9s-l!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b0c34e-1f7c-4a6c-b3ee-179e28be26ae_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9s-l!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b0c34e-1f7c-4a6c-b3ee-179e28be26ae_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9s-l!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b0c34e-1f7c-4a6c-b3ee-179e28be26ae_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9s-l!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b0c34e-1f7c-4a6c-b3ee-179e28be26ae_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>Blaming China has become one of the few things Democrats and Republicans agree on. Donald Trump built a political brand around it. Joe Biden kept Trump&#8217;s tariffs in place and added new ones on Chinese EVs, solar cells, and steel.</span><sup><span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a></span></sup><span> By 2024, 171 campaign ads for congressional or presidential candidates mentioned China.</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a><span> The prevalence of this rhetoric raises an important question: What benefits do politicians reap from using anti-China rhetoric? More specifically, is it possible that pointing the finger at Beijing lets politicians off the hook for domestic failures?</span></p><p><span>As a research assistant for the KU Trade War Lab, I worked on a project that used two waves of KU Trade War Lab survey data to test whether using rhetoric that frames foreign rivals as the cause of American problems shifts blame away from US politicians, or simply causes people to blame both geopolitical rivals and domestic political actors. The survey experiment employed 2,578 U.S. adults combined (1,218 in 2020 and 1,360 in 2025) and randomly assigned respondents to see either China or Japan on a select-all blame attribution question asking who is responsible for the country&#8217;s current economic problems, with Japan serving as the control. Respondents could assign blame to the president, Republican Congress, Democratic Congress, Canada, Mexico, China or Japan, corporations, unions, or no one, and they could select as many targets as they wanted. From these responses, I constructed four outcomes: Foreign (selecting at least one foreign actor), Domestic (at least one domestic actor), Both, and No one.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Q0BW!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b453dc8-e8ac-42df-99a2-8db078494dda_1962x1099.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Q0BW!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b453dc8-e8ac-42df-99a2-8db078494dda_1962x1099.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Q0BW!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b453dc8-e8ac-42df-99a2-8db078494dda_1962x1099.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Q0BW!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b453dc8-e8ac-42df-99a2-8db078494dda_1962x1099.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Q0BW!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b453dc8-e8ac-42df-99a2-8db078494dda_1962x1099.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Q0BW!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b453dc8-e8ac-42df-99a2-8db078494dda_1962x1099.png" width="1456" height="816" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/6b453dc8-e8ac-42df-99a2-8db078494dda_1962x1099.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:816,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:109095,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/183960503?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b453dc8-e8ac-42df-99a2-8db078494dda_1962x1099.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Q0BW!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b453dc8-e8ac-42df-99a2-8db078494dda_1962x1099.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Q0BW!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b453dc8-e8ac-42df-99a2-8db078494dda_1962x1099.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Q0BW!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b453dc8-e8ac-42df-99a2-8db078494dda_1962x1099.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Q0BW!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b453dc8-e8ac-42df-99a2-8db078494dda_1962x1099.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p><span>The preliminary results support the theory that blaming foreign rivals &#8220;spreads&#8221; political blame attribution rather than &#8220;shifts&#8221; it to foreign actors alone. The share of respondents who named at least one domestic actor barely moved, sitting 1.8 percentage points lower in the China group compared to the Japan group in 2020 and 0.7 points higher in 2025, and neither difference was statistically distinguishable from zero. Having the option to name China raised foreign blame by 18.4 percentage points in 2020 and 8.1 percentage points in 2025 relative to the Japan condition. The &#8220;Both&#8221; category, respondents who blamed foreign and domestic actors simultaneously, also rose sharply when respondents were given the option to blame China, by 15.6 percentage points in 2020 and 7.8 in 2025. Voters who saw China on the list blamed foreign actors at much higher rates than those given the option to blame Japan, but did not reduce the blame they placed on the president, Congress, or any other domestic target. They added a target without subtracting one.</span></p><p><span>The partisan breakdown tells an interesting story about how the effect of being presented with the option to blame China effects people&#8217;s tendency to attribute domestic problems to foreign actors. In 2020, Republicans drove nearly all of the foreign blame effect. Having the option to name China increased Republican foreign blame by 30.8 percentage points relative to Republicans who saw Japan, a far larger increase than among Democrats or Independents, and this difference was highly significant (p&lt;.001). By 2025, that partisan gap had largely closed. Naming China as a potential cause of domestic problems now raises foreign blame attribution among Democrats, Independents, and Republicans by roughly the same amount. This may reflect the normalization of U.S.-China conflict across both a Democratic and Republican administration. Anti-China rhetoric is no longer a distinctly Republican signal.</span></p><p><span>My preliminary finding that naming China spreads blame rather than shifts it has consequences for how we think about democratic accountability. Politicians who blame China may not be successfully deflecting responsibility for economic outcomes. Instead, they could be expanding the set of actors that voters hold responsible without reducing the pressure on domestic leaders. The added effect of naming China was smaller in 2025 than in 2020 (8.1 versus 18.4 percentage points), which may suggest that the larger 2020 effect owed much to the COVID-19 pandemic, when China was front-of-mind as the origin of the virus, and that by 2025 the effect of the pandemic had faded, but anti-China rhetoric was still strong enough that people blamed the country for domestic issues. The core pattern that respondents tended to blame China along with domestic actors held across both waves and across five years of very different political environments.</span></p><p><span>This project could be improved in several ways. The two waves are not identical samples, so comparisons over time partly reflect differences in who responded. The blame measure is also a single select-all item, which captures whether respondents name an actor but not how strongly or why. Future work could examine which domestic actors absorb blame alongside China and test the patterns across education as well as party.</span></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>NPR, &#8220;Biden announces new tariffs on Chinese EVs, semiconductors and other goods,&#8221; May 10, 2024, </span><a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/05/10/1250670539/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles"><span>npr.org/2024/05/10/1250670539</span></a><span>.</span></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>NPR, &#8220;Tens of millions already being spent on campaign ads naming China,&#8221; November 15, 2023, </span><a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/11/15/1212875400/china-campaign-ads-election"><span>npr.org/2023/11/15/1212875400</span></a><span>.</span></p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Small Yard Problem: How America and Japan De-Risk from China]]></title><description><![CDATA[This post was originally published on Celis Institute and is reposted here with permission.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/the-small-yard-problem-how-america</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/the-small-yard-problem-how-america</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Trade War Lab]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 14:11:32 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7r9G!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdd5f9ca1-c794-4512-a3ef-0ee111b92666_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7r9G!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdd5f9ca1-c794-4512-a3ef-0ee111b92666_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7r9G!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdd5f9ca1-c794-4512-a3ef-0ee111b92666_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7r9G!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdd5f9ca1-c794-4512-a3ef-0ee111b92666_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7r9G!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdd5f9ca1-c794-4512-a3ef-0ee111b92666_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7r9G!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdd5f9ca1-c794-4512-a3ef-0ee111b92666_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7r9G!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdd5f9ca1-c794-4512-a3ef-0ee111b92666_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7r9G!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdd5f9ca1-c794-4512-a3ef-0ee111b92666_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7r9G!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdd5f9ca1-c794-4512-a3ef-0ee111b92666_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7r9G!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdd5f9ca1-c794-4512-a3ef-0ee111b92666_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7r9G!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdd5f9ca1-c794-4512-a3ef-0ee111b92666_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><a href="https://www.celis.institute/celis-institute/small_yard_problem_usjapan_de-risk_from_china/">The Small Yard Problem: How America and Japan De-Risk from China - CELIS Institute - Investment Screening | National Security | Competitiveness.</a> </p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p>China&#8217;s rise and fears of weaponized interdependence are causing democracies to rethink the relationship between their trade policies and national security. Are semiconductors and rare earths important to national security? How about garlic imported from China? Legislative efforts in the United States have proposed each item is worthy of de-risking and highlight the growing scope of the economic security debate. The 117th Congress saw the CHIPS and Science Act and other landmark industrial policies. Later in 2023, Senator Rick Scott <a href="https://www.rickscott.senate.gov/services/files/9448682E-58D0-4FA2-9C50-8C50D4CB1E7A">sent a letter</a> to the Commerce Department warning that Chinese garlic, grown, as he put it, &#8220;in sewage,&#8221; had no place in American grocery stores. Surely enough he would propose a bill that would limit the imports of Chinese garlic into the US. On the other side of the Pacific, Japan has <a href="https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/4716#je_ch2">ushered</a> in the world&#8217;s first comprehensive economic security law which designates critical materials that Japan must de-risk. In this context, Japan has also leveraged industrial policy towards semiconductors, but also for airplane parts and fertilizers. With such a wide variety of products being securitized in this geopolitical environment we arrive at the research question: How are advanced democracies around the world dealing with the trade-offs between economic security and economic freedom?</p><p>To examine how the de-risking debate varies across democratic contexts, advanced democracies such as the United States and Japan will clarify what the future debates over economic security and economic freedom might look like. My co-authored work with Jack Zhang, <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/lgeo/1/1/article-p54_5.xml">published in </a><em><a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/lgeo/1/1/article-p54_5.xml">Law &amp; Geoeconomics</a></em>, takes a close look at exactly this question by comparing how the United States and Japan have approached the task of &#8220;de-risking&#8221; their economies from China. De-risking proponents call for constructing small yards and high fences around key products and vulnerabilities. However, de-risking is inherently difficult: about 40% of all trade is globally <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/our-research/geopolitics-and-the-geometry-of-global-trade">concentrated</a>, in which three or fewer economies provide at least 90% of global exports. A top-down national security argument is that some items, such as rare earths and other key inputs, might lead to dependencies that can be weaponized due to their overreliance on chokepoints. That said, the bottom-up politics of trade suggests that domestic special interests will be keen on influencing these debates to ensure that they emerge as winners of these economic security policies with redistributive outcomes. After all, in the United States and Japan domestic interests are key for understanding how Congress votes on free trade and how the Japanese Diet liberalizes its markets. Japan and the US have penned numerous bills that are aimed at revisiting their economic relations with China. The two countries have emerged as key barometers to examine what the future of de-risking might look like.</p><h4>Japan Got Here First and Did It Differently</h4><p>Japan&#8217;s economic security debate began well before similar discussions in Washington arose. In 2010, following a territorial dispute<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html">, China was accused of restricting rare earth exports</a> to Japan -materials essential for electronics, electric motors, and defense technology. Japan&#8217;s dependence on China for roughly 90% of its rare earth supply quickly manifested into a strategic vulnerability. Japan&#8217;s response was measured, technocratic, and effective. Through targeted subsidies and active diversification, Japan worked to <a href="https://umimpact.umt.edu/en/publications/securing-supply-chain-resiliency-for-critical-rare-earth-metals/">reduce</a> its rare earth dependence on China from around 90% to roughly 58% by 2018.</p><p>This instinct for precision culminated in Japan&#8217;s Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA), passed in 2022. The law is notable for what it includes and what it deliberately leaves out. It identifies eleven specific strategic materials such as semiconductors, fertilizers, antimicrobials, ship parts, and other various products. The law also implements a framework for adding in future products as was the case in the expansion of this list to include advanced electronics in 2024. In contrast to policy debates mentioning geopolitically distant countries such as China and Russia, the act never mentions China by name. The framing is forward-looking and systemic: Japan is securing what its people need whilst avoiding openly antagonizing their neighbor it still does billions of dollars of business with every year. That said, given that the previous rare earths de-risking program took 8 years to bear fruit it will take time before the effectiveness of this new policy can be evaluated.</p><h4>The American Approach: Everything, Everywhere, All At Once</h4><p>The United States joined the de-risking debate later and louder. The 2018 trade war and the COVID-19 supply chain catastrophe all combined to produce a bipartisan legislative wave of economic security policy proposals in Congress. Between 2018 and 2024 our paper identifies 166 bills in Congress that target traded goods with China. This number exploded tenfold between 2022 and 2023 as the number of such bills introduced in Congress went from 10 to 105 bills and resolutions. This number underscores legislative interest that followed landmark bills such as the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346">CHIPS and Science Act</a>, the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1155/text">Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act</a>, and the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5376/text">Inflation Reduction Act</a>.</p><p>With the World Trade Organisation in disarray, Congress has predictably argued for trade restrictions towards China on all sorts of rationale. The range of products caught up in this wave is wide-ranging: it includes everything from semiconductors and cloud computing infrastructure to consumer drones, mail, and even milk and garlic imported from China. The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, one of the most significant pieces of legislation in this space, restricts a large variety of imports from China&#8217;s Xinjiang region on human rights grounds. Though the legislation has framing not directly tied to national security, Beijing would <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/china-denounces-uyghur-forced-labor-prevention-act-as-destabilising-supply-chains-and-creating-unemployment/">interpret</a> this act no differently than these other acts due to the economic externalities being all the same.</p><p>As evidenced by the various areas of commerce now subject to trade restrictions, the US approach is broader in almost every measurable sense when compared to Japan&#8217;s narrow definitions of economic security. The CHIPS and Science Act alone committed more than $52 billion to semiconductor reshoring, which is several times the entire initial budget Japan allocated across all eleven of its ESPA-designated products. The United States also deploys a far wider toolkit: tariffs, export controls, investment screening, entity lists, sanctions, visa cancellations. This wide variety of products whose trade is now restricted highlights that separating protectionism from national security in the US case is increasingly difficult in the bilateral context of US-China trade relations in which all aspects are becoming securitized.</p><h4>US and Japanese Convergence</h4><p>Although there are pointed differences in US and Japanese economic engagement with China, there is meaningful convergence along key products. Both countries have made semiconductors a top priority. Japan is now home to a <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/japan-semiconductor-hub-chipmakers-tsmc-kumamoto-silicon-valley-5848356">TSMC fabrication plant in Kumamoto</a>, as the <a href="https://www.nbc4i.com/intel-in-ohio/intel-spent-1-4-billion-in-ohio-in-2025-doesnt-anticipate-further-delays/">US is building new Intel capacity in Ohio</a> with various other projects popping up through both nations as a result of these industrial policies. Both have securitized the aviation industry, information technology infrastructure, and nuclear energy. Both are worried, in different ways, about the same fundamental problem: decades of economic integration with China have created chokepoints that China could, in a crisis, exploit.</p><p>This overlap is a key finding of our research. When two allied democracies with different political systems, different industrial structures, and different relationships with China independently arrive at the same list of concerns, that convergence carries real weight. It suggests that the &#8220;small yard&#8221; - the genuine security-relevant core of de-risking - is real. What remains to be determined is how many more small yards there will be and how high of fences that Japan and the US will be willing to build.</p><h4>The Future of the De-Risking Movement</h4><p>The debate isn&#8217;t just academic: for every product that becomes securitized, the economic price tag will land on the taxpayer. Consumers pay more either at the checkout or through higher taxes leveraged for industrial policies like the CHIPS and Science Act. Unilateral policies rarely only affect the targeted country: multinational corporations get caught in the crossfire as Japanese companies, like Uniqlo, <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/japans-uniqlo-shirts-was-seized-by-us-customs-after-officials-suspected-they-were-produced-using-forced-labor-in-xinjiang/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">face real disruption</a> from US restrictions on Xinjiang cotton that had nothing to do with Japanese policy. Economic security policies and any move that restricts bilateral trade will have global ripple effects.</p><p>Japan, for its part, still largely believes in the rules-based trading system as it remains committed to multilateral frameworks. By contrast, between both presidential candidates walking away from the Trans Pacific Partnership in 2016, to President Biden&#8217;s continuation of the US-China trade war, Washington&#8217;s embrace of the international free trade regime has weakened. Despite these differences there will also be opportunities: as debates over global economic freedom reignite, will de-risking bring friendshoring and economic security cooperation? Perhaps if many small yards and high fences are constructed, small gates will be installed as well to ensure economic exchange with like-minded countries.</p><p>As more products are swept into the security tent and as the small yards grow more numerous and the fences taller, the question becomes unavoidable: if everything can be a national security issue, how can states demarcate where business can remain business and what products necessitate yards and high fences? While our article focused on the approaches taken by Washington and Tokyo, these dilemmas are not unique to them. Other major actors, such as the European Union, are grappling with these debates. Future research could build upon this analysis by examining how other actors approach these same debates. Finally, these debates are far more than academic. The economic costs of getting it wrong are not abstract: they show up in prices, in jobs, and in the durability of the alliances these policies are supposed to protect.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Does a Bigger Bailout Buy More Loyalty? Farmers Say No]]></title><description><![CDATA[The intensifying U.S.-China Trade War has contributed to an immense loss of export markets for farmers.]]></description><link>https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/does-a-bigger-bailout-buy-more-loyalty</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.tradewarlab.com/p/does-a-bigger-bailout-buy-more-loyalty</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Lance Lang]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2026 17:03:27 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CfRH!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F36d7e2a6-5424-4918-b89c-73f2a8e3629d_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CfRH!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F36d7e2a6-5424-4918-b89c-73f2a8e3629d_1456x1048.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CfRH!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F36d7e2a6-5424-4918-b89c-73f2a8e3629d_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CfRH!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F36d7e2a6-5424-4918-b89c-73f2a8e3629d_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CfRH!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F36d7e2a6-5424-4918-b89c-73f2a8e3629d_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CfRH!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F36d7e2a6-5424-4918-b89c-73f2a8e3629d_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CfRH!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F36d7e2a6-5424-4918-b89c-73f2a8e3629d_1456x1048.jpeg" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/36d7e2a6-5424-4918-b89c-73f2a8e3629d_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1301079,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/i/201360202?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F36d7e2a6-5424-4918-b89c-73f2a8e3629d_1456x1048.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CfRH!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F36d7e2a6-5424-4918-b89c-73f2a8e3629d_1456x1048.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CfRH!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F36d7e2a6-5424-4918-b89c-73f2a8e3629d_1456x1048.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CfRH!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F36d7e2a6-5424-4918-b89c-73f2a8e3629d_1456x1048.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CfRH!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F36d7e2a6-5424-4918-b89c-73f2a8e3629d_1456x1048.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>The intensifying U.S.-China Trade War has contributed to an immense loss of export markets for farmers. Meanwhile, the Iran War continues to heighten fuel and fertilizer costs. With farmers in jeopardy and midterms on the horizon, pundits and analysts alike are looking to assess how economic hardship may shape rural electoral engagement.</span></p><blockquote></blockquote><p><span>To cushion these mounting pressures, the Trump administration has relied on the 2025 </span><a href="https://www.fsa.usda.gov/resources/income-support/emergency-commodity-assistance-program"><span>Emergency Commodity Assistance Program</span></a><span> (ECAP) to support the agricultural sector. ECAP provides large-scale direct payments to producers experiencing weak commodity prices and elevated input costs. Complementing this, the existing Agriculture Risk Coverage program (ARC) functions as a safety-net program that triggers payments when actual farm revenues fall below established benchmark guarantees. These programs matter not only as economic stabilizers, but also as political tools and in rural America. It is therefore important to understand whether this or future economic assistance can shore up farmer&#8217;s support for the Republican party.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p><span>This question sits at the center of </span><a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055424000571"><span>Jake Jares and Neil Malhotra&#8217;s recent publication</span></a><span>. Drawing on evidence from the first Trump Administration&#8217;s attempt to stem the cost of trade war, the Market Facilitation Program (MFP), the authors examine how exposure to trade shocks and subsequent government assistance influences farmers&#8217; political participation and voting behavior. The authors leveraged variation in the MFP&#8217;s payment structure which, due to idiosyncrasies in program design, resulted in substantially different compensation levels across farmers based solely on their 2018 crop portfolios, with some producers undercompensated for tariff induced losses while others were significantly overcompensated. Using a sample of more than 165,000 affected voters, the authors link variation in net MFP benefits to two primary outcomes: turnout in the 2018 midterm elections and campaign contribution behavior in the months following the trade shock. This design allows for an assessment of how differential exposure to economic harm and subsequent federal relief translates into measurable changes in political participation and donor behavior.</span></p><blockquote></blockquote><p><span>Jares and Malhotra find that, contrary to expectations, variation in policy generosity had little to no meaningful effect on political participation. While improved compensation under the MFP, which provided direct payments to U.S. farmers to offset income losses caused by Chinese retaliatory tariffs, modestly increased farmers&#8217; perceptions that the policy was helpful, it did not translate into statistically significant changes in turnout or campaign contributions. Among Republican farmers&#8212;the primary focus of the analysis&#8212;moving from the 25% to the 75% percentile of net benefits from the MFP resulted in only a 0.3 percentage point increase in turnout, a substantively negligible effect. Non-Republican farmers similarly showed no meaningful changes in political engagement if provided with more generous assistance, indicating that relief outcomes did not differentially mobilize or demobilize any partisan group.</span></p><p><span>Additionally, no evidence exemplifies that improved compensation influenced campaign contribution behavior in either direction, with effects on Republican and Democratic giving effectively indistinguishable from zero. Even when accounting for prior turnout history, the results remain stable, suggesting that ceiling effects are unlikely to explain the null findings.</span></p><p><span>The authors further examine how political engagement evolved over different phases of the trade war to better isolate the effects of exposure to both the trade war shock and ameliorative policies. First, comparing the voting patterns of farmers and demographically similar non-farmers, their results suggest that acute exposure to the trade war itself motivated farmers to vote in the 2018 midterm election. On average, Republican farmers&#8217; turnout was 1.2 percentage points higher than comparable non-farmers who did not experience the trade war directly, while Democratic farmer&#8217;s turnout was 1.7 higher. Returning to campaign contributions, the authors find that in the early months of the trade war, before retaliatory tariffs were imposed on US agriculture, there were no statistically significant or substantively large differences in contribution behavior between farmers and comparable non-farmers. Following the June 15 tariff escalation and China&#8217;s retaliatory measures, crop futures prices fell sharply. However, this economic disruption did not immediately translate into changes in political contributions among either Republican or Democratic farmers. Similarly, the announcement of a $12 billion relief package on July 24 produced little observable response in donation behavior in the short run. More pronounced, though still modest, changes only emerge after MFP benefit rates are announced on August 27, and enrollment begins in early September. At that point, farmers with different political backgrounds show small but statistically significant increases in Republican-leaning contributions, while Democratic farmers show no meaningful shifts.</span></p><blockquote></blockquote><p><span>The largely null results are important because they suggest that even sizable variation in policy outcomes may have limited effects on political mobilization. Taken together, these findings advance two key strands of political science research: one on economic voting and responsiveness to government policy, and another on political mobilization through distributive benefits. The authors conclude that political engagement is shaped less by the magnitude of individual compensation and more by the broader visibility and salience of the policy environment, particularly the Trade War itself and the government&#8217;s response to it.</span></p><p><span>More broadly, the results challenge the idea that incumbent parties can reliably increase electoral participation among their base simply by delivering favorable economic policy outcomes by compensating economic losers. Instead, they suggest that the political effects of policy are more limited and contingent than often assumed.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.tradewarlab.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Trade War Lab! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>